The normative ontology of the law - Peter Cane's responsibility in law and morality

Implications of Peter Cane's analysis of responsibility in 'Responsibility in Law and Morality' - Cane's preconceptualisation of the 'symbiotic' relationship between law and morality - a principal criticism is that Cane does not develop his seven methodological principles into a more ambitious argument.

Human behaviour modelled as a statistico-deterministic turing machine

'Free will' and its corollary, the concept of individual responsibility are keystones of the justice system. This paper shows that if we accept a physics that disallows time reversal, the concept of 'free will' is undermined by an integrated understanding of the influence of genetics and environment on human behavioural responses. Analysis is undertaken by modelling life as a novel statistico-deterministic version of a Turing machine, i.e. as a series of transitions between states at successive instants of time. Using this model it is proven by induction that the entire course of life is independent of the action of free will. Although determined by prior state, the probability of transitions between states in response to a standard environmental stimulus is not equal to 1 and the transitions may differ quantitatively at the molecular level and qualitatively at the level of the whole organism. Transitions between states correspond to behaviours. It is shown that the behaviour of identical twins (or clones), although determined, would be incompletely predictable and non-identical, creating an illusion of the operation of 'free will'. 'Free will' is a convenient construct for current judicial systems and social control because it allows rationalization of punishment for those whose behaviour falls outside socially defined norms. Indeed, it is conceivable that maintenance of ideas of free will has co-evolved with community morality to reinforce its operation. If the concept is free will is to be maintained it would require revision of our current physical theories.

Conflicting obligations: Pufendorf, Leibniz and Barbeyrac on civil authority

Barbeyrac's republication of and commentary on Leibniz' attack on Pufendorf's natural-law doctrine is often seen as symptomatic of the failure of all three early moderns to solve a particular moral-philosophical problem: that of the relationship between civil authority and morality. Making use of the first English translation of Barbeyrac's work, this article departs from the usual view by arguing that here we are confronted by three conflicting constructions of civil obligation, arising not from the common intellectual terrain of moral philosophy, but from divergent religious and political cultures. If this approach makes the three constructions less susceptible to theoretical reconciliation, then it opens them to a more revealing historical investigation, in terms of the particular religious and political circumstances in which they arose, and which they were designed to address. The result is that these early modern struggles over the nature of civil obligation confront us again as unfinished historical business.

Employment services in an age of e-government

The increasing use of information and communications technologies among government departments and non-government agencies has fundamentally changed the implementation of employment services policy in Australia. The administrative arrangements for governing unemployment and unemployed people are now constituted by a complex contractual interplay between government departments as ‘purchasers’ and a range of small and large private organizations as ‘providers’. Assessing, tracking and monitoring the activities of unemployed people through the various parts of the employment services system has been made possible by developments in information technology and tailored computer programs. Consequently, the discretionary capacity that is traditionally associated with ‘street-level bureaucracy’ has been partly transformed into more prescriptive forms of ‘screen-level bureaucracy’. The knowledge embedded in these new computer-based technologies is considered superior because it is based on ‘objective calculations’, rather than subjective assessments of individual employees. The relationship between the sociopolitical context of unemployment policy and emerging forms of e-government is explored using illustrative findings from a qualitative pilot study undertaken in two Australian sites. The findings suggest that some of the new technologies in the employment services system are welcomed, while other applications are experienced as contradictory to the aims of delivering a personalized and respectful service.