3 resultados para cognitive illusion

em University of Queensland eSpace - Australia


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Four variations on Two Envelope Paradox are stated and compared. The variations are employed to provide a diagnosis and an explanation of what has gone awry in the paradoxical modeling of the decision problem that the paradox poses. The canonical formulation of the paradox underdescribes the ways in which one envelope can have twice the amount that is in the other. Some ways one envelope can have twice the amount that is in the other make it rational to prefer the envelope that was originally rejected. Some do not, and it is a mistake to treat them alike. The nature of the mistake is diagnosed by the different roles that rigid designators and definite descriptions play in unproblematic and in untoward formulations of decision tables that are employed in setting out the decision problem that gives rise to the paradox. The decision maker’s knowledge or ignorance of how one envelope came to have twice the amount that is in the other determines which of the different ways of modeling his decision problem is correct. Under this diagnosis, the paradoxical modeling of the Two Envelope problem is incoherent.

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It is well established that people tend to rate themselves as better than average across many domains. To maintain these illusions, it is suggested that people distort feedback about their own and others' performance. This study examined expert/novice differences in self-ratings when people compared themselves with others of the same level of expertise and background as themselves. Given that a key expert characteristic is increased self-monitoring, we predicted that experts in a domain may have a reduced illusion of superiority because they are more aware of their actual ability. We compared expert police drivers with novice police drivers and found that this prediction was not supported. Expert police drivers rated themselves as superior to equally qualified drivers, to the same degree as novices, Cohen's d = .03 ns. Despite their extensive additional training and experience, experts still appear to be as susceptible to illusions of superiority Lis everyone else. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Different components of driving skill relate to accident involvement in different ways. For instance, while hazard-perception skill has been found to predict accident involvement, vehicle-control skill has not. We found that drivers rated themselves superior to both their peers and the average driver on 18 components of driving skill (N = 181 respondents). These biases were greater for hazard-perception skills than for either vehicle-control skills or driving skill in general. Also, ratings of hazard-perception skill related to self-perceived safety after overall skill was controlled for. We suggest that although drivers appear to appreciate the role of hazard perception in safe driving, any safety benefit to be derived from this appreciation may be undermined by drivers' inflated opinions of their own hazard-perception skill. We also tested the relationship between illusory beliefs about driving skill and risk taking and looked at ways of manipulating drivers' illusory beliefs.