Do chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) understand single invisible displacement?

Previous research suggests that chimpanzees understand single invisible displacement. However, this Piagetian task may be solvable through the use of simple search strategies rather than through mentally representing the past trajectory of an object. Four control conditions were thus administered to two chimpanzees in order to separate associative search strategies from performance based on mental representation. Strategies involving experimenter cue-use, search at the last or first box visited by the displacement device, and search at boxes adjacent to the displacement device were systematically controlled for. Chimpanzees showed no indications of utilizing these simple strategies, suggesting that their capacity to mentally represent single invisible displacements is comparable to that of 18-24-month-old children.

Do chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and 2-year-old children (Homo sapiens) understand double invisible displacement?

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and young children (Homo sapiens) have difficulty with double invisible displacements in which an object is hidden in two nonadjacent boxes in a linear array. Experiment 1 eliminated the possibility that chimpanzees' previous poor performance was due to the hiding direction of the displacement device. As in Call (2001), subjects failed double nonadjacent displacements, showing a tendency to select adjacent boxes. In Experiments 2 and 3, chimpanzees and 24-month-old children were tested on a new adaptation of the task in which four hiding boxes were presented in a diamond-shaped array on a vertical plane. Both species performed above chance on double invisible displacements using this format, suggesting that previous poor performance was due to a response bias or inhibition problem rather than a fundamental limitation in representational capacity.

Cross-reactive recognition of human and primate cytomegalovirus sequences by human CD4 cytotoxic T lymphocytes specific for glycoprotein B and H

Although the importance of CD4(+) T cell responses to human cytonnegalovirus (HCMV) has recently been recognized in transplant and immunosuppressed patients, the precise specificity and nature of this response has remained largely unresolved. In the present study we have isolated CD4(+) CTL which recognize epitopes from HCMV glycoproteins gB and gH in association with two different HLA-DR antigens, DRA1*0101/DRB1*0701 (DR7) and DRA1*0101/DRB1*1101 (DR11). Comparison of amino acid sequences of HICMV isolates revealed that the gB and gH epitope sequences recognized by human CD4(+) T cells were not only conserved in clinical isolates from HCMV but also in CMV isolates from higher primates (chimpanzee, rhesus and baboon). Interestingly, these epitope sequences from chimpanzee, rhesus and baboon CMV are efficiently recognized by human CD4(+) CTL. More importantly, we show that gB-specific T cells from humans can also efficiently lyse pepticle-sensitized Patr-DR7(+) cells from chimpanzees. These findings suggest that conserved gB and gH epitopes should be considered while designing a prophylactic vaccine against HCMV. In addition, they also provide a functional basis for the conservation of MHC class 11 lineages between humans and Old World primates and open the possibility for the use of such primate models in vaccine development against HCMV.

How primatology can inform us about the evolution of the humand mind

Humans are primates. We have evolved from common ancestors and the evolution of the human body is becoming increasingly clear as the archeological record expands. But for most people the gap between humans and animals lies in the mind, not in the body. And minds do not fossilise. To reconstruct the evolution of mind, scholars have thus increasingly looked to our closest relatives for clues. Here I discuss four ways in which the study of primates may inform such reconstruction: fact-finding, phylogenetic reconstruction, analogy, and regression models. Knowledge about primates can help us bridge the gap. Extinction of our closest relatives, on the other hand, would not only deplete that source of information but also increase the apparent differences between animal and human minds. It is likely that we have a long history of displacing closely related species, including the other hominids, leading us to appear ever more unique.

Imitation recognition in a captive chimpanzee (pan troglodytes)

This study investigated the ability of a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) to recognise when he is being imitated. In the experimental condition of test 1a, an experimenter imitated the postures and behaviours of the chimpanzee as they were being displayed. In three control conditions the same experimenter exhibited (1) actions that were contingent on, but different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, (2) actions that were not contingent on, and different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, or (3) no action at all. The chimpanzee showed more "testing" sequences (i.e., systematically varying his actions while oriented to the imitating experimenter) and more repetitive behaviour when lie was being imitated, than when he was not. This finding was replicated 4 months later in test 1b. When the experimenter repeated the same actions she displayed in the experimental condition of test 1a back to the chimpanzee in test 2, these actions now did not elicit those same testing sequences or repetitive behaviours. However, a live imitation condition did. Together these results provide the first evidence of imitation recognition in a nonhuman animal.

Copying actions and copying outcomes: Social learning through the second year

The present work documents how the logic of a model's demonstration and the communicative cues that the model provides interact with age to influence how children engage in social learning. Children at ages 12, 18, and 24 months (n = 204) watched a model open a series of boxes. Twelve-month-old subjects only copied the specific actions of the model when they were given a logical reason to do so- otherwise, they focused on reproducing the outcome of the demonstrated actions. Eighteen-month-old subjects focused on copying the outcome when the model was aloof. When the model acted socially, the subjects were as likely to focus on copying actions as outcomes, irrespective of the apparent logic of the model's behavior. Finally, 24-month-old subjects predominantly focused on copying the model's specific actions. However, they were less likely to produce the modeled outcome when the model acted nonsocially.