Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market

The existence of undesirable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market requires an efficient auction mechanism. However, many of the existing auction mechanism have difficulties in suppressing such unreasonable price spikes effectively. A new auction mechanism is proposed to suppress effectively unreasonable price spikes in a competitive electricity market. It optimally combines system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction mechanisms. A threshold value is determined to activate the switching between the marginal price auction and the proposed composite auction. Basically when the system marginal price is higher than the threshold value, the composite auction for high price electricity market is activated. The winning electricity sellers will sell their electricity at the system marginal price or their own bid prices, depending on their rights of being paid at the system marginal price and their offers' impact on suppressing undesirable price spikes. Such economic stimuli discourage sellers from practising economic and physical withholdings. Multiple price caps are proposed to regulate strong market power. We also compare other auction mechanisms to highlight the characteristics of the proposed one. Numerical simulation using the proposed auction mechanism is given to illustrate the procedure of this new auction mechanism.

Is the Australian wool futures market efficient as a predictor of spot prices?

Giles and Goss (1980) have suggested that, if a futures market provides a forward pricing function, then it is an efficient market. In this article a simple test for whether the Australian Wool Futures market is efficient is proposed. The test is based on applying cointegration techniques to test the Law of One Price over a three, six, nine, and twelve month spread of futures prices. We found that the futures market is efficient for up to a six-month spread, but no further into the future. Because futures market prices can be used to predict spot prices up to six months in advance, woolgrowers can use the futures price to assess when they market their clip, but not for longer-term production planning decisions. (C) 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation

In this paper we suggest a model of sequential auctions with endogenous participation where each bidder conjectures about the number of participants at each round. Then, after learning his value, each bidder decides whether or not to participate in the auction. In the calculation of his expected value, each bidder uses his conjectures about the number of participants for each possible subgroup. In equilibrium, the conjectured probability is compatible with the probability of staying in the auction. In our model, players face participation costs, bidders may buy as many objects as they wish and they are allowed to drop out at any round. Bidders can drop out at any time, but they cannot come back to the auction. In particular we can determine the number of participants and expected prices in equilibrium. We show that for any bidding strategy, there exists such a probability of staying in the auction. For the case of stochastically independent objects, we show that in equilibrium every bidder who decides to continue submits a bid that is equal to his value at each round. When objects are stochastically identical, we are able to show that expected prices are decreasing.

Stock splits: Implications for investor trading costs

Stock splits are known to have a negative effect on market quality—while stock prices adjust consistently with the split's scale, the bid/ask spread and market depth do not. Two possible explanations for the relative increase in spread are that (i) splits cause an increase in market maker costs that are passed along to investors or (ii) splits provide a mechanism for market makers to increase excess profits. Using a robust econometric methodology, we find evidence of the latter, which raises questions about the motivation of the splitting practice. We also document that while NASDAQ spreads appear to adjust more fully than those of NYSE/AMEX stocks, NASDAQ spreads are higher in general.