Open-economy central banking: Explaining Australia's recommitment to central bank independence

Why do governments offload major instruments such as monetary policy to an independent central bank? This article answers this question in relation to the Australian case, a case which reflects wider global developments. The article challenges the methodology of quantitative approaches to explaining central bank independence and instead argues that a model of 'embedded statism' is the most fruitful explanatory approach.

The Limits of Rational Choice: New Institutionalism in the Test Bed of Central Banking Politics in Australia

This paper tests the explanatory capacities of different versions of new institutionalism by examining the Australian case of a general transition in central banking practice and monetary politics: namely, the increased emphasis on low inflation and central bank independence. Standard versions of rational choice institutionalism largely dominate the literature on the politics of central banking, but this approach (here termed RC1) fails to account for Australian empirics. RC1 has a tendency to establish actor preferences exogenously to the analysis; actors' motives are also assumed a priori; actor's preferences are depicted in relatively static, ahistorical terms. And there is the tendency, even a methodological requirement, to assume relatively simple motives and preference sets among actors, in part because of the game theoretic nature of RC1 reasoning. It is possible to build a more accurate rational choice model by re-specifying and essentially updating the context, incentives and choice sets that have driven rational choice in this case. Enter RC2. However, this move subtly introduces methodological shifts and new theoretical challenges. By contrast, historical institutionalism uses an inductive methodology. Compared with deduction, it is arguably better able to deal with complexity and nuance. It also utilises a dynamic, historical approach, and specifies (dynamically) endogenous preference formation by interpretive actors. Historical institutionalism is also able to more easily incorporate a wider set of key explanatory variables and incorporate wider social aggregates. Hence, it is argued that historical institutionalism is the preferred explanatory theory and methodology in this case.

Conditional risk, return and contagion in the banking sector in Asia

This paper investigates risk and return in the banking sector in three Asian markets of Taiwan, China and Hong Kong. The study focuses on the risk-return relation in a conditional factor GARCH-M framework that controls for time-series effects. The factor approach is adopted to incorporate intra-industry contagion and an analysis of spillovers between large banks and small banks. Finally, the study provides evidence on these relations before and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The results are generally consistent across the markets and with expectations.

Credibility and staff conduct make or break bank customer service quality

Service quality is assessed by customers along the dimensions of staff conduct, credibility, communication, and access to teller services. Credibility and staff conduct emerge as the highest loading first-order factors. This highlights the significance of rectifying mistakes while keeping customers informed, and employing branch staff that are responsive and civilized in their conduct. Discovery of a valid second-order factor, namely, overall customer service quality, underscores the importance of providing quality service across all its dimensions. For example, if the bank fails to rectify mistakes and keep customers informed but excels in all other dimensions, its overall customer service quality can still be rated poorly.

State Banks and Economic Development in China

State-owned banks remain dominant in China's financial sector despite over two decades of gradual financial liberalization. Their performance is typically evaluated using commercial banking criteria. The standard view is that because state banks have experienced declining profitability and capital adequacy, they have been a drain on past economic development and endanger future growth prospects. However, we argue that state banks have strong development bank characteristics and hence warrant different performance criteria. The analysis in this paper suggests that while thier commercial performance may have been poor, the overall impact of state banks on China's economic development appears to have been both positive and sustainable. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Cross-border insolvency: Adoption of CLERP 8 as an evolution of Australian insolvency law

In 1997 the United Nations adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and recommended that member states adopt it as part of domestic legislation. In 2002 Australia, an active participant in UNCITRAL's Working Group on Insolvency Law, announced that the next phase of the Commonwealth Government's Corporate Law Economic Reform Program would be a review of cross-border insolvency law. CLERP 8 seeks feedback on the proposed enactment of the Model Law by a separate Commonwealth statute. This article places such a development within the context of Australian cross-border insolvency law as it has evolved from early English bankruptcy legislation through case law arising from the banking collapses of the late 19th century to the more recent jurisprudence produced by corporate collapses of the late 1980s to early 1990s and current high-profile insolvencies.