Aboriginal self-determination in Australia - The effects of minority-majority frames and target universalism on majority collective guilt and compensation attitudes

In the context of Aboriginal-Anglo Australian relations, we tested the effect of framing (multiculturalism versus separatism) and majority group members' social values (universalism) on the persuasiveness of Aboriginal group rhetoric, majority collective guilt, attitudes toward compensation, and reparations for Aboriginals. As predicted, Anglo Australians who are low on universalism report more collective guilt when presented with a multiculturalist than a separatist Aboriginal frame, whereas those high on universalism report high levels of guilt independent of frame. The same pattern was predicted and found for the persuasiveness of the rhetoric and attitudes toward compensation. Our data suggest that (a) for individuals low in universalism, framing produces attitudes consonant with compensation because it produces collective guilt and (b) the reason that universalists are more in favor of compensation and reparation is because of high collective guilt. We discuss the strategic use of language to create power through the manipulation of collective guilt in political contexts.

Non-mereological universalism

In this paper I develop a version of universalism that is non-mereological. Broadly speaking, non-mereological universalism is the thesis that for any arbitrary set of objects and times, there is a persisting object which, at each of those times, will be constituted by those of the objects that exist at that time. I consider two general versions of non-mereological universalism, one which takes basic simples to be enduring objects, and the other which takes simples to be instantaneous objects. This yields three versions of endurantism, of which I ultimately defend the version I call universalist endurantism. Universalist endurantism is the thesis that (i) for any arbitrary set S of instantaneous simples that exist at the same instant, there exists a fusion of the members of S, and (ii) for any arbitrary set S* of instantaneous fusions each of which exist at a different instant, there exists an enduring object O that is constituted by those fusions at those instants. Universalist endurantism is ‘non-mereological’ in that the relation that holds between instantaneous fusions and persisting objects is not the part/whole relation, but rather, is the relation of constitution, thus allowing that the persisting objects are three rather than four dimensional. I argue that universalist endurantism not only has the various benefits of mereological universalism in allowing vagueness to be explicated as semantic indeterminacy, but in addition allows the endurantist to hold that some properties are genuinely intrinsic and are exemplified simpliciter.