Does anticipation of back pain predispose to back trouble?

Limb movement imparts a perturbation to the body. The impact of that perturbation is limited via anticipatory postural adjustments. The strategy by which the CNS controls anticipatory postural adjustments of the trunk muscles during limb movement is altered during acute back pain and in people with recurrent back pain, even when they are pain free. The altered postural strategy probably serves to protect the spine in the short term, but it is associated with a cost and is thought to predispose spinal structures to injury in the long term. It is not known why this protective strategy might occur even when people are pain free, but one possibility is that it is caused by the anticipation of back pain. In eight healthy subjects, recordings of intramuscular EMG were made from the trunk muscles during single and repetitive arm movements. Anticipation of experimental back pain and anticipation of experimental elbow pain were elicited by the threat of painful cutaneous stimulation. There was no effect of anticipated experimental elbow pain on postural adjustments. During anticipated experimental back pain, for single arm movements there was delayed activation of the deep trunk muscles and augmentation of at least one superficial trunk muscle. For repetitive arm movements, there was decreased activity and a shift from biphasic to monophasic activation of the deep trunk muscles and increased activity of superficial trunk muscles during anticipation of back pain. In both instances, the changes were consistent with adoption of an altered strategy for postural control and were similar to those observed in patients with recurrent back pain. We conclude that anticipation of experimental back pain evokes a protective postural strategy that stiffens the spine. This protective strategy is associated with compressive cost and is thought to predispose to spinal injury if maintained long term. © Guarantors of Brain 2004; all rights reserved

Reduced variability of postural strategy prevents normalization of motor changes induced by back pain: A risk factor for chronic trouble?

Variability is fundamental to biological systems and is important in posturomotor learning and control. Pain induces a protective postural strategy, although variability is normally preserved. If variability is lost, does the normal postural strategy return when pain stops? Sixteen subjects performed arm movements during control trials, when the movement evoked back pain and then when it did not. Variability in the postural strategy of the abdominal muscles and pain-related cognitions were evaluated. Only those subjects for whom pain induced a reduction in variability of the postural strategy failed to return to a normal strategy when pain stopped. They were also characterized by their pain-related cognitions. Ongoing perception of threat to the back may exert tighter evaluative control over variability of the postural strategy.

The conserved quantity theory of causation and chance raising

In this paper I offer an 'integrating account' of singular causation, where the term 'integrating' refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The 'process' intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of misconnections', where an event which serves to prevent another fails to do so on a particular occasion and yet the two events are linked by causal processes. The chance raising intuition, according to which causes raise the chance of their effects, easily accounts for misconnections but faces the problem of chance lowering causes, a problem easily accounted for by the process approach. The integrating program attempts to provide an analysis of singular causation by synthesising the two insights, so as to solve both problems. In this paper I show that extant versions of the integrating program due to Eells, Lewis, and Menzies fail to account for the chance-lowering counterexample. I offer a new diagnosis of the chance lowering case, and use that as a basis for an integrating account of causation which does solve both cases. In doing so, I accept various assumptions of the integrating program, in particular that there are no other problems with these two approaches. As an example of the process account, I focus on the recent CQ theory of Wesley Salmon (1997).

Age and Offending: Characteristics and Criminological Factors

Adolescence is popularly understood as a transitional phase of turbulence and extremes. It is also often associated with 'trouble'. Criminal justice statistics, however, reveal that youth criminality remains a relatively rare phenomenon, less than one percent of the total adolescent population in any given year. This exceptional book is based upon a major Australian research programme to consider the key social factors impacting upon the lives of young people. A sample of 1,300 young people was divided into three major subgroups: a 'control' group, drawn from state secondary schools and closely approximating the general population; a chronically marginalized cohort representing a 'vulnerable group', and a group of offenders, most of whom were incarcerated at the time of the research.

Embodied women at work in neo-liberal times and places

In this article five women explore (female) embodiment in academic work in current workplaces. In a week-long collective biography workshop they produced written memories of themselves in their various workplaces and memories of themselves as children and as students. These memories then became the texts out of which the analysis was generated. The authors examine the constitutive and seductive effects of neoliberal discourses and practices, and in particular, the assembling of academic bodies as particular kinds of working bodies. They use the concept of chiasma, or crossing over, to trouble some aspects of binary thinking about bodies and about the relations between bodies and discourses. They examine the way that we simultaneously resist and appropriate, and are seduced by and appropriated within, neoliberal discourses and practices.

Levinas and the defination of philosophy: An ethical approach

Emmanuel Levinas’ thought seems to be strictly neither rational, phenomenological nor ontological, and it thus intentionally exposes itself to the asking of the question ‘why call it philosophy at all’? While we may have trouble containing Levinas’ thought within our traditional philosophical boundaries, I argue that this gives us no reason to exclude him from philosophy proper as a mere poser, but rather provides the occasion for reflection on just what it means, in an ethical manner, to call something ‘philosophical’. Instead of asking whether or not philosophy can ‘contain’ Levinas’ thought, I contend that it would be more ethical to instead re-phrase the question in terms of ‘sociality’. When we do this, I argue, we can indeed justifiably call Levinas’ thought philosophy.