The determinants of the vertical boundaries of the construction firm

In the last few years, transaction cost economics has become a popular theory within the construction research community. This approach has been singularly applied as a means to explain and predict phenomena concerning the construction firm, including its vertical boundaries. However, this is at a time when the chief proponents of transaction costs are urging researchers to take a pluralistic stance in relation to the theory of the firm. The aim of this paper is to develop a pluralistic approach to the vertical boundaries of the construction firm. In order to achieve this, an integrative framework is described, based on the development of the efficient boundaries problem and the capabilities approach to vertical integration. Specifically, this framework draws on the complementary strengths of transaction cost economics and the resource-based view. It is concluded that the potential relative merits of theoretical pluralism, in terms of the vertical boundaries of the construction firm, are sufficient grounds to motivate empirical testing of the predictions associated with the integrative framework of vertical integration presented

The Hierarchical Structure of the Firm: A Geometric Perspective

This paper incorporates hierarchical structure into the neoclassical theory of the firm. Firms are hierarchical in two respects: the organization of workers in production and the wage structure. The firm’s hierarchy is represented as the sector of a circle, where the radius represents the hierarchy’s height, the width of the sector represents the breadth of the hierarchy at a given height, and the angle of the sector represents span of control for any given supervisor. A perfectly competitive firm then chooses height and width, as well as capital inputs, in order to maximize profit. We analyze the short run and long run impact of changes in scale economies, input substitutability and input and output prices on the firm’s hierarchical structure. We find that the firm unambiguously becomes more hierarchical as the specialization of its workers increases or as its output price increases relative to input prices. The effect of changes in scale economies is contingent on the output price. The model also brings forth an analysis of wage inequality within the firm, which is found to be independent of technological considerations, and only depends on the firm’s wage schedule.