Market reaction to takeover rumour in internet discussion sites

We examine the market reaction to takeover rumour postings in the Hotcopper Internet Discussion Site (IDS). Results from the interday analysis show abnormal returns and trading volumes on the day before and the day of the posting. Results of the intraday analysis show abnormal returns and trading volumes during the 10 min posting interval and abnormal trading volume during the 10 min interval immediately preceding it. Sensitivity analyses indicate that the results are robust to concerns regarding potential confounds, credibility and bid–ask spread bias. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the market reacting to the posting of takeover rumours in IDS.

Takeovers: Acceptance facilities revisited in the Patrick case

Takeovers undertaken in Australia are highly regulated transactions. Once shareholders in the target accept an offer they have a limited opportunity, if any at all, to reconsider or revoke their acceptance in the light of new circumstances. Arguably, this explains target shareholders reluctance to accept an offer made for their shares under a takeover. The problem of shareholder inertia in takeovers has been identified by bidders, who have sought to induce bid acceptance through the use of innovative mechanisms. The efficacy of the Acceptance Facility mechanism was recently revisited in the Panel decision in Patrick Corporation Ltd’s takeover by Toll Holdings Ltd.

Alternating offer games and private rulings of the Australian Tax Office

The concept of submitting oneself to a voluntary negotiation is by no means new to big business. Formal bargaining has been quite successful over the years in providing the venue for agents to explore a more logical and mathematical approach to bargaining. However in more recent times external influences have been applied to agents who provide better deals for favored executives. This external influence has displayed itself in taxtion negotiations to the extent that tax office agents have been dismissed for irresponsible conduct. We explore this specific type of negotiation using an alternating offer bargaining game to model the particular influences, which create unfair rulings in negotiations. By the constraints of this systematic mathematical approach to negotiation, we will explore the advantages of a more formal game theoretic approach. In this presentation we will also elaborate on finding Nash Equilibrium in alternating offer games.