Jules Cotard (1840-1889) - His life and the unique syndrome which bears his name

Dr. Jules Cotard (1840-1889) was a Parisian neurologist who first described the delire des negations. Cotard's syndrome or Cotard's delusion comprises any one of a series of delusions ranging from the fixed and unshakable belief that one has lost organs, blood, or body parts to believing that one has lost one's soul or is dead. In its most profound form, the delusion takes the form of a professed belief that one does not exist. Encountered primarily in psychoses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, Cotard's syndrome has also been described in organic lesions of the nondominant temporoparietal cortex as well as in migraine. Cotard's delusion is the only self-certifiable syndrome of delusional psychosis. Jules Cotard, a Parisian neurologist and psychiatrist and former military surgeon, was one of the first to induce cerebral atrophy by the experimental embolization of cerebral arteries in animals and a pioneer in studies of the clinicopathologic correlates of cerebral atrophy secondary to perinatal and postnatal pathologic changes. He was the first to record that unilateral cerebral atrophy in infancy does not necessarily lead to aphasia and was also the pioneer of studies of altered conscious states in diabetic hyperglycemia.

The morals of metaphysics: Kant's 'Groundwork' as intellectual paideia

To approach philosophy as a way of working on the self means to begin not with the experience it clarifies and the subject it discovers, but with the acts of self‐transformation it requires and the subjectivity it seeks to fashion. Commenting on the variety of spiritual exercises to be found in the ancient schools, Pierre Hadot remarks that: Some, like Plutarch’s ethismoi, designed to curb curiosity, anger or gossip, were only practices intended to ensure good moral habits. Others, particularly the meditations of the Platonic tradition, demanded a high degree of mental concentration. Some, like the contemplation of nature as practiced in all philosophical schools, turned the soul toward the cosmos, while still others—rare and exceptional—led to a transfiguration of the personality, as in the experiences of Plotinus. We also saw that the emotional tone and notional content of these exercises varied widely from one philosophical school to another: from the mobilization of energy and consent to destiny of the Stoics, to the relaxation and detachment of the Epicureans, to the mental concentration and renunciation of the sensible world among the Platonists.1 While successfully applied to ancient philosophy,2 this approach has not been widely exploited in the history of philosophy more broadly. There is, however, at least one study of medieval metaphysics in these terms,3 and there are some important discussions of early modern Stoicism and Epicureanism.4 And a recent study of Hume shows the fruitfulness of the approach for Enlightenment philosophy.5 It is all the more surprising then that there seems to have been no serious attempt to approach Kant’s moral philosophy in this way.

Cortex, cognition and the cell: New insights into the pyramidal neuron and prefrontal function

Arguably the most complex conical functions are seated in human cognition, the how and why of which have been debated for centuries by theologians, philosophers and scientists alike. In his best-selling book, An Astonishing Hypothesis: A Scientific Search for the Soul, Francis Crick refined the view that these qualities are determined solely by cortical cells and circuitry. Put simply, cognition is nothing more, or less, than a biological function. Accepting this to be the case, it should be possible to identify the mechanisms that subserve cognitive processing. Since the pioneering studies of Lorent de No and Hebb, and the more recent studies of Fuster, Miller and Goldman-Rakic, to mention but a few, much attention has been focused on the role of persistent neural activity in cognitive processes. Application of modern technologies and modelling techniques has led to new hypotheses about the mechanisms of persistent activity. Here I focus on how regional variations in the pyramidal cell phenotype may determine the complexity of cortical circuitry and, in turn, influence neural activity. Data obtained from thousands of individually injected pyramidal cells in sensory, motor, association and executive cortex reveal marked differences in the numbers of putative excitatory inputs received by these cells. Pyramidal cells in prefrontal cortex have, on average, up to 23 times more dendritic spines than those in the primary visual area. I propose that without these specializations in the structure of pyramidal cells, and the circuits they form, human cognitive processing would not have evolved to its present state. I also present data from both New World and Old World monkeys that show varying degrees of complexity in the pyramidal cell phenotype in their prefrontal cortices, suggesting that cortical circuitry and, thus, cognitive styles are evolving independently in different species.

Irja' ila Nafsika: Suhraward's apperception of the self in light of Avicenna

Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d.687/1191) proposed a theory of apperception that constitutes the core of his “illuminative” epistemology. His theory of apperception purports to account for the soul’s immediate, reflexive, and unmediated knowledge of its own essence. Apperception may be defined as the direct experience the soul has of its essence. A closer examination of the Avicennan tradition (Avicenna died in 420/1037) reveals the existence of a number of arguments for the demonstration of an apperception of the self/soul similar to the arguments Suhrawardī later proposes. Contrary to admitted views, Avicenna had tackled issues related to the soul’s apperception, a type of perception distinct from the soul’s intellection of its essence. Avicenna alluded to the existence of a mode of perception specific to the soul that would guarantee both the soul’s unity and its personal identity. This apperception is defined as an unmediated presence of the soul to itself. These elements recur in Suhrawardī’s theory of apperception and numerous versions of Avicenna’s arguments for the demonstration of the presential nature of apperception