Competitive advantage in public-sector organizations: explaining the public good/sustainable competitive advantage paradox

Resource-based views of the firm and in particular Kay's (Why Firms Succeed. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995) model of sustainable competitive advantage have been used to advance an understanding of differences in the competitive advantage of private-sector firms. We extend the analysis to a public-sector firm where its major purpose includes engaging in public good by giving away its knowledge base and services. The case highlights the paradox that many public-sector organizations face in simultaneously pursuing public good and sustainable competitive advantage. While Kay's model is applicable for understanding intergovernmental agency competition, we find it necessary to incorporate resource dependency theory to address the paradox. Implications for theory and practice are provided. (C) 2002 Elsevier Inc. All rights reseved.

Individual and household willingness to pay for public goods

The issue of whether willingness to pay (WTP) for the benefits generated by a public good should be elicited on an individual or on a household basis is addressed. Differences between individual and household WTP may arise when members of the household are mutually altruistic. It is shown that, for general specifications of altruism, household WTP is less than the sum of household members' individual WTP. Implications for the choice between household and individual measures of WTP are considered, and issues in the elicitation of household WTP are addressed.

The paradox of commercialising public sector intellectual property

The juxtapositioning of government providing a public good through research and development investment on one hand and engaging in commercialisation of the research outcome on the other is a paradox. Using agricultural research as an example, we examine the nature of the paradox to determine if commercialisation potentially leads to a conflict in the role of public research institutions set up to fulfil public good responsibilities. We identify the reasons for the shift in policy towards commercialisation and greater exploitation of public sector intellectual property and how this has contributed to the emergence of the apparent inconsistency. We argue that the belief in working for public good is inherent and embedded in an organisation's history and its wider operating environment. We propose that the creation of public sector intellectual property and its commercialisation are influenced by the political, social and economic environment in which the public institutions operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The land assembly problem revisited

As in the standard land assembly problem, a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land belonging to two different owners. The value of the two blocks of land to the developer is greater than the sum of the individual values of the blocks for each owner. Unlike the land assembly literature, however, our focus is on the incentive that each lot owner has to delay the start of negotiations, rather than on the public goods nature of the problem. An incentive for delay exists, for example, when owners perceive that being last to sell will allow them to capture a larger share of the joint surplus from the development. We show that competition at point of sale can cause equilibrium delay, and that cooperation at point of sale will eliminate delay. This suggests that strategic delay is another source for the inefficient allocation of land, in addition to the public-good type externality pointed out by Grossman and Hart [Bell Journal of Economics 11 (1980) 42] and O'Flaherty [Regional Science and Urban Economics 24 (1994) 287]. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The role of uncertainty in the relationship between fairness evaluations and willingness to pay

Participants in contingent valuation studies may be uncertain about a number of aspects of the policy and survey context. The uncertainty management model of fairness judgments states that individuals will evaluate a policy in terms of its fairness when they do not know whether they can trust the relevant managing authority or experience uncertainty due to insufficient knowledge of the general issues surrounding the environmental policy. Similarly, some researchers have suggested that, not knowing how to answer WTP questions, participants convey their general attitudes toward the public good rather than report well-defined economic preferences. These contentions were investigated in a sample of 840 residents in four urban catchments across Australia who were interviewed about their WTP for stormwater pollution abatement. Four sources of uncertainty were measured: amount of prior issue-related thought, trustworthiness of the water authority, insufficient scenario information, and WTP response uncertainty. A logistic regression model was estimated in each subsample to test the main effects of the uncertainty sources on WTP as well as their interaction with fairness and proenvironmental attitudes. Results indicated support for the uncertainty management model in only one of the four samples. Similarly, proenvironmental attitudes interacted rarely with uncertainty to a significant level, and in ways that were more complex than hypothesised. It was concluded that uncertain individuals were generally not more likely than other participants to draw on either fairness evaluations or proenvironmental attitudes when making decisions about paying for stormwater pollution abatement.

Rental housing provision for lower income older Australians

The number of people aged 65 years or over in low-income rental households will more than double by 2026. The social housing system, at its current growth rate, will not meet their needs. This research involved demographic projections of older renters, examined their housing preferences, and analysed the supply capacity of the public and private rental sectors to respond.