A sociolinguistic approach to applied epistemology: Examining technocratic values in global 'knowledge' policy

This special issue presents an excellent opportunity to study applied epistemology in public policy. This is an important task because the arena of public policy is the social domain in which macro conditions for ‘knowledge work’ and ‘knowledge industries’ are defined and created. We argue that knowledge-related public policy has become overly concerned with creating the politico-economic parameters for the commodification of knowledge. Our policy scope is broader than that of Fuller (1988), who emphasizes the need for a social epistemology of science policy. We extend our focus to a range of policy documents that include communications, science, education and innovation policy (collectively called knowledge-related public policy in acknowledgement of the fact that there is no defined policy silo called ‘knowledge policy’), all of which are central to policy concerned with the ‘knowledge economy’ (Rooney and Mandeville, 1998). However, what we will show here is that, as Fuller (1995) argues, ‘knowledge societies’ are not industrial societies permeated by knowledge, but that knowledge societies are permeated by industrial values. Our analysis is informed by an autopoietic perspective. Methodologically, we approach it from a sociolinguistic position that acknowledges the centrality of language to human societies (Graham, 2000). Here, what we call ‘knowledge’ is posited as a social and cognitive relationship between persons operating on and within multiple social and non-social (or, crudely, ‘physical’) environments. Moreover, knowing, we argue, is a sociolinguistically constituted process. Further, we emphasize that the evaluative dimension of language is most salient for analysing contemporary policy discourses about the commercialization of epistemology (Graham, in press). Finally, we provide a discourse analysis of a sample of exemplary texts drawn from a 1.3 million-word corpus of knowledge-related public policy documents that we compiled from local, state, national and supranational legislatures throughout the industrialized world. Our analysis exemplifies a propensity in policy for resorting to technocratic, instrumentalist and anti-intellectual views of knowledge in policy. We argue that what underpins these patterns is a commodity-based conceptualization of knowledge, which is underpinned by an axiology of narrowly economic imperatives at odds with the very nature of knowledge. The commodity view of knowledge, therefore, is flawed in its ignorance of the social systemic properties of ��knowing’.

Psychoanalytic perspectives on substance use and antisocial personality disorder

Psychoanalysis and related psychodynamic psychotherapies have historically had a limited engagement with substance use and antisocial personality disorders. This in part reflects an early preoccupation with 'transference neuroses' and in part reflects later de-emphasis of diagnosis and focus on therapeutic process. Nonetheless, psychoanalytic perspectives can usefully inform thinking about approaches to treatment of such disorders and there are psychoanalytic constructs that have specific relevance to their treatment. This paper reviews some prominent strands of psychoanalytic thinking as they pertain to the treatment of substance abuse and antisocial personality disorders. It is argued that, while Freudian formulations lead to a primarily pessimistic view of the prospect of treatment of such disorders, both the British object relations and the North American self psychology traditions suggest potentially productive approaches. Finally the limited empirical evidence from brief psycho dynamically informed treatments of substance use disorders is reviewed. It is concluded that such treatments are not demonstrably effective but that, since no form of psychotherapy has established high efficacy with substance use disorders, brief psychdynamic therapies are not necessarily of lesser value than other treatments and may have specific value for particular individuals and in particular treatment contexts.

Social epistemology: A journal of knowledge, culture and policy

Provides a forum for philosophical and social scientific enquiry that incorporates the work of scholars from a variety of disciplines who share a concern with the production, assessment and validation of knowledge.

Popper's Explications of Ad hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content, and Scientific Practice

Popper's explications of 'ad hoc' in relation to hypotheses and explanations turn out to be either trivial, confused or mistaken. One such explication I discuss at length is circularity; another is reduction in empirical content. I argue that non-circularity is preferable to non-ad hocness for an acceptable explanation or explanans, and I isolate some persistent errors in his analysis. Second, Popper is barking up the wrong tree in proscribing reductions in empirical content in novel hypotheses. Such reductions may constitute scientific progress. He fails to show that ad hoc hypothesis are the threat to science he claims.

Popper and his Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: a close shave for the Law of Gravitation?

Knowledge of residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus in the early 1840s did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation but instead to the discovery of Neptune in 1846. Karl Popper asserts that this case is atypical of science and that the law of gravitation was at least prima facie falsified by these perturbations. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position I call, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF). Further, on the evidence the law was not prima facie false and was not generally considered so by astronomers at the time. Many of Popper's commentators (Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and others) presuppose WPF and their views on this case and its implications for scientific rationality and method suffer from this same defect.