Social indicators and comparisons of living standards

Construction of an international index of standards of living, incorporating social indicators and economic output, typically involves scaling and weighting procedures that lack welfare-economic foundations. Revealed preference axioms can be used to make quality-of-life comparisons if we can estimate the representative household's production technology for the social indicators. This method is applied to comparisons of gross domestic product (GDP) and life expectancy for 58 countries. Neither GDP rankings, nor the rankings of the Human Development Index (HDI), are consistent with the partial ordering of revealed preference. A method of constructing a utility-consistent index incorporating both consumption and life expectancy is suggested. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Incentives and standards in agency contracts

This paper studies the structure of state-contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multitasking. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multitasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multitasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible outputs play in helping the agent deal with the production risk associated with the observable and contractible outputs. When the noncontractible outputs are risk substitutes and are socially undesirable, standards are never optimal. If the noncontractible outputs are socially desirable, standards are never optimal if the noncontractible outputs play a risk-complementary role.