Re McBain; ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference

The case of Re McBain; ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference sought to make an order under s 76 of the Constitution that the decision of the Federal Court was incorrect in law - decision was made on the basis of constitutional and procedural issues - High Court consolidated the definition of 'matter' in sections 75 and 76 of the Constitution - writ of certiorari considered - role of the Attorney-General in proceedings in which he had granted a fiat - case reiterated the role of the judiciary in Australia.

Principles of Australian public law

In this relatively short book, David Clark sets out to fill what he perceives to be a gap in the presently available writing on Australian public law by achieving two distinct objectives. The first is to remedy 'one of the oddest limitations of current public law writing in Australia' by detailing the history and operation of the state and territory constitutions as well as their philosophical underpinnings. The other is to explore certain areas of federal public law, such as the laws applicable to the constitution and operation of the Commonwealth Parliament and non-judicial bodies such as the Ombudsman, which are often not dealt with in leading constitutional and administrative law texts. It is acknowledged by the author that attempting to cover such a wide range of topics is a 'high-wire act'. Fortunately, apart from one slight stumble, Clark manages to keep his balance and has produced a useful précis of a number of the institutions and concepts that are fundamental to the orderly functioning of Australian society.

The Constitutional (In)Validity of Religious Vilification Laws: Implications for Their Interpretation

A study is conducted to determine whether religious vilification laws are contrary to the implied freedom of political communication affirmed in the High Court's decision in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation. He feels that to the extent that religious vilification laws are interpreted with principles, they are likely to leave sufficient place for freedom of religious discussion that happens to be relevantly political, at the same time the implied freedom of political means that the prohibitions imposed by religious vilification laws need to be interpreted narrowly and the exceptions construed widely, in order to leave room for political communication.