Theory-of-mind development in oral deaf children with cochlear implants or conventional hearing aids

Background: In the context of the established finding that theory-of-mind (ToM) growth is seriously delayed in late-signing deaf children, and some evidence of equivalent delays in those learning speech with conventional hearing aids, this study's novel contribution was to explore ToM development in deaf children with cochlear implants. Implants can substantially boost auditory acuity and rates of language growth. Despite the implant, there are often problems socialising with hearing peers and some language difficulties, lending special theoretical interest to the present comparative design. Methods: A total of 52 children aged 4 to 12 years took a battery of false belief tests of ToM. There were 26 oral deaf children, half with implants and half with hearing aids, evenly divided between oral-only versus sign-plus-oral schools. Comparison groups of age-matched high-functioning children with autism and younger hearing children were also included. Results: No significant ToM differences emerged between deaf children with implants and those with hearing aids, nor between those in oral-only versus sign-plus-oral schools. Nor did the deaf children perform any better on the ToM tasks than their age peers with autism. Hearing preschoolers scored significantly higher than all other groups. For the deaf and the autistic children, as well as the preschoolers, rate of language development and verbal maturity significantly predicted variability in ToM, over and above chronological age. Conclusions: The finding that deaf children with cochlear implants are as delayed in ToM development as children with autism and their deaf peers with hearing aids or late sign language highlights the likely significance of peer interaction and early fluent communication with peers and family, whether in sign or in speech, in order to optimally facilitate the growth of social cognition and language.

Mind and body: Concepts of human cognition, physiology and false belief in children with autism or typical development

This study examined theory of mind (ToM) and concepts of human biology (eyes, heart, brain, lungs and mind) in a sample of 67 children, including 25 high functioning children with autism (age 6-13), plus age-matched and preschool comparison groups. Contrary to Baron-Cohen [1989, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19(4), 579-600], most children with autism correctly understood the functions of the brain (84%) and the mind (64%). Their explanations were predominantly mentalistic. They outperformed typically developing preschoolers in understanding inner physiological (heart, lungs) and cognitive (brain, mind) systems, and scored as high as age-matched typical children. Yet, in line with much previous ToM research, most children with autism (60%) failed false belief, and their ToM performance was unrelated to their understanding of. human biology. Results were discussed in relation to neurobiological and social-experiential accounts of the ToM deficit in autism.

Recalling yesterday and predicting tomorrow

Three-, 4- and 5-year-old children were asked to report something that they did do yesterday and something that they were going to do tomorrow. They were also asked to recall events that had not occurred yesterday, and predict events that would not occur tomorrow. In two studies these simple questions revealed striking age differences in the ability to report personal events from the past and the future. Only a minority of 3-year-olds but a majority of the older children were able to appropriately answer these questions. These findings substantiate the proposal that the ability to recall past events and the ability to predict future events (i.e., mental time travel), emerge in tandem between the ages of 3 and 5 years. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A Comparison of Paediatric Occupational Therapy University Program Curricula in New Zealand, Australia, and Canada

Comparisons were made of the paediatric content of professional entry-level occupational therapy university program curricula in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada using an ex post facto surveymethodology. The findings indicated that in Australia/New Zealand, paediatrics made up 20% of the total curriculum, but only 13% in Canada. Canadian reference materials were utilized less often in Canadian universities than in Australia/New Zealand. Theories taught most often in Australia/New Zealand were: Sensory Integration, Neurodevelopmental Therapy, Client-Centered Practice, Playfulness, and the Model of Human Occupation. In Canada, the most frequent theories were: Piaget’s Stages ofCognitive/Intellectual Development, Neurodevelopmental Therapy, Erikson’s Eight Stages of Psychosocial Development and Sensory Integration. The most frequently taught paediatric assessment tools in both regions were the Bruininks-Oseretsky Test of Motor Proficiency and Miller Assessment for Preschoolers. Paediatric interventionmethods taught to students in all three countries focused on activities of daily living/self-care, motor skills, perceptual and visual motor integration, and infant and child development. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: Website: ©2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.]

Telling the story of theory of mind: Deaf and hearing children's narratives and mental state understanding

Theory of mind (ToM) was examined in late-signing deaf children in two studies by using standard tests and measures of spontaneous talk about inner states of perception, affect and cognition during storytelling. In Study 1, there were 21 deaf children aged 6 to 11 years and 13 typical-hearing children matched with the deaf by chronological age. In Study 2, there were 17 deaf children aged 6 to 12 years and 17 typical-hearing preschoolers aged 4 to 5 years who were matched with the deaf by ToM test performance. In addition to replicating the consistently reported finding of poor performance on standard false belief tests by late-signing deaf children, significant correlations emerged in both studies between deaf children's ToM test scores and their spontaneous narrative talk about imaginative cognition (e.g. 'pretend'). In Study 2, with a new set of purpose-built pictures that evoked richer and more complex mentalistic narration than the published picture book of Study 1, results of multiple regression analyses showed that children's narrative talk about imaginative cognition was uniquely important, over and above hearing status and talking of other kinds of mental states, in predicting ToM scores. The same was true of children's elaborated narrative talk using utterances that either spelt out thoughts, explained inner states or introduced contrastives. In addition, results of a Guttman scalograrn analysis in Study 2 suggested a consistent sequence in narrative and standard test performance by deaf and hearing children that went from (1) narrative mention of visible (affective or perceptual) mental states only, along with FB failure, to (2) narrative mention of cognitive states along with (1), to (3) elaborated narrative talk about inner states along with (2), and finally to (4) simple and elaborated narrative talk about affective/perceptual and cognitive states along with FIB test success. Possible explanations for this performance ordering, as well as for the observed correlations in both studies between ToM test scores and narrative variables, were considered.

Mental playmates: Siblings, executive functioning and theory of mind

This study assessed the theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) abilities of 124 typically developing preschool children aged 3 to 5 years in relation to whether or not they had a child-aged sibling (i.e. a child aged 1 to 12 years) at home with whom to play and converse. On a ToM battery that included tests of false belief, appearance-reality (AR) and pretend representation, children who had at least 1 child-aged sibling scored significantly higher than both only children and those whose only siblings were infants or adults. The numbers of child-aged siblings in preschoolers' families positively predicted their scores on both a ToM battery (4 tasks) and an EF battery (2 tasks), and these associations remained significant with language ability partialled out. Results of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed that independent contributions to individual differences in ToM were made by language ability, EF skill and having a child-aged sibling. However, even though some conditions for mediation were met, there was no statistically reliable evidence that EF skills mediated the advantage of presence of child-aged siblings for ToM performance. While consistent with the theory that distinctively childish interaction among siblings accelerates the growth of both TOM and EF capacities, alternative evidence and alternative theoretical interpretations for the findings were also considered.

Linguistic determinism and theory of mind in deaf children

DeVilliers and DeVilliers (2000, 2005) propose that deaf and hearing children acquire a theory of mind (or the understanding that human behaviour is the product of psychological states like true and false beliefs) as a consequence of their linguistic mastery of a rule of syntax. Specifically, they argue that the syntactic rule for sentential complementation with verbs of speech (e.g., “say”) precedes syntactic mastery of complementation for cognition (e.g., “think”) and both of these developmentally precede and promote conceptual mastery of a theory of mind (ToM), as indexed via success on standard false belief tests. The present study examined this proposition in groups of primary-school-aged deaf children and hearing preschoolers who took false belief tests and a modified memory for complements test that included control questions. Guttman scaling techniques indicated no support either for the prediction that syntactic skill precedes ToM understanding or for the earlier emergence of complementation for “say” than for “think”. Methodological issues and implications for deaf children's ToM development are discussed.