Social epistemology: A journal of knowledge, culture and policy

Provides a forum for philosophical and social scientific enquiry that incorporates the work of scholars from a variety of disciplines who share a concern with the production, assessment and validation of knowledge.

The philosophical significance of Cox's theorem

Cox's theorem states that, under certain assumptions, any measure of belief is isomorphic to a probability measure. This theorem, although intended as a justification of the subjectivist interpretation of probability theory, is sometimes presented as an argument for more controversial theses. Of particular interest is the thesis that the only coherent means of representing uncertainty is via the probability calculus. In this paper I examine the logical assumptions of Cox's theorem and I show how these impinge on the philosophical conclusions thought to be supported by the theorem. I show that the more controversial thesis is not supported by Cox's theorem. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Teaching economic philosophy: Economics, ethics and the search for the right maximand

Economic philosophy is not often taught, and is not necessarily easily taught. It involves enquiry into implicit assumptions within orthodox economics and within alternatives to it. It seeks to highlight why it is that some critics object that neoclassical economics is too atomistic, hedonistic, and rationalistic, or why others lament that there is much hidden metaphysics in Friedman and his Chicago School colleagues. It addresses the issue of whether - in a reversal of the view that economics is the imperialistic social science - significant philosophical assumptions have been silently but inescapably imported into orthodox economics. This paper seeks to facilitate the presentation of such material with illustrations selected from social economics, development economics, and critiques of utilitarianism.

BIO Logical Agents: Norms, Beliefs, Intentions in Defeasible Logic

In this paper we follow the BOID (Belief, Obligation, Intention, Desire) architecture to describe agents and agent types in Defeasible Logic. We argue, in particular, that the introduction of obligations can provide a new reading of the concepts of intention and intentionality. Then we examine the notion of social agent (i.e., an agent where obligations prevail over intentions) and discuss some computational and philosophical issues related to it. We show that the notion of social agent either requires more complex computations or has some philosophical drawbacks.

Providing evidence-based answers to clinical questions - A pilot information service for general practitioners

Objective: To pilot a clinical information service for general practitioners. Methods: A representative sample of 31 GPs was invited to submit clinical questions to a local academic department of general practice. Their views on the service and the usefulness of the information were obtained by telephone interview. Results: Over one month, nine GPs (29% of the sample, 45% of those stating an interest), submitted 20 enquiries comprising 45 discrete clinical questions. The median time to search for evidence, appraise it and write answers to each enquiry was 2.5 hours (range, 1.0-7.4 hours). The median interval between receipt of questions and dispatch of answers was 3 clays (range, 1-12 days). Conclusions: The GPs found the answers useful in clinical decision making; in four out of 20 cases patient management was altered.

Swapping space for time and unfair tests of ecological models

Testing ecological models for management is an increasingly important part of the maturation of ecology as an applied science. Consequently, we need to work at applying fair tests of models with adequate data. We demonstrate that a recent test of a discrete time, stochastic model was biased towards falsifying the predictions. If the model was a perfect description of reality, the test falsified the predictions 84% of the time. We introduce an alternative testing procedure for stochastic models, and show that it falsifies the predictions only 5% of the time when the model is a perfect description of reality. The example is used as a point of departure to discuss some of the philosophical aspects of model testing.

John Waldridge, The Leaven of the Ancients: Suhrawardi and the Heritage of the Greeks, SUNY Series in Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). Pp. 323

In the Leaven of the Ancients, John Walbridge studies the appropriation of non–Peripatetic philosophical ideas by an anti–Aristotelian Islamic philosopher, Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi (d. 1191). He proposes a comprehensive explanation of the origin of Suhrawardi's philosophical system, a revival of the “wisdom of the Ancients” and its philosophical affiliations “grounded” in Greek philosophy (p. xiii). Walbridge attempts to uncover the reasons for Suhrawardi's rejection of the prevailing neo–Aristotelian synthesis in Islamic philosophy, Suhrawardi's knowledge and understanding of non–Aristotelian Greek philosophy, the ancient philosophers Suhrawardi was attempting to follow, the relationship between Suhrawardi's specific philosophical teachings (logic, ontology, physics, and metaphysics), and his understanding of non–Aristotelian ancient philosophy and the relationship between Suhrawardi's system and the major Greek philosophers, schools, and traditions—in particular the Presocratics, Plato, and the Stoics (p. 8). Copyright © 2003 Cambridge University Press

The Sooty show laid bear - Children, puppets and make-believe

This article seeks to examine the complex nature of pretence as portrayed in a popular UK children's television puppet show. Central to the various theoretical concerns with make-believe philosophical, psychological and lucid - has been the phenomenological axis of the 'real-imaginary'. Because of the serial types of transformations undertaken by characters in the programme and the reliance placed on natural models of conversation, the problematic nature of this core boundary is highlighted. Despite its overt status as a fictional representation of animal behaviour, the very animality of the puppets is rendered opaque as their identities as children are linguistically accomplished. As a consequence we argue that the show as a piece of representational art is structured by moral and behavioural dictates typical of conventional adult-child interaction.