Believing badly

This paper explores the grounds upon which moral judgment of a person's beliefs is properly made. The beliefs in question are non-moral beliefs and the objects of moral judgment are individual instances of believing. We argue that instances of believing may be morally wrong on any of three distinct grounds: (i) by constituting a moral hazard, (ii) by being the result of immoral inquiry, or (iii) by arising from vicious inner processes of belief formation. On this way of articulating the basis of moral judgment of belief it becomes clear that rational and epistemic norms do not exhaust the kinds of normative judgment properly made of a person's state of believing. We argue that there are instances of believing that are both rational and true and yet morally wrong.

The philosophical significance of Cox's theorem

Cox's theorem states that, under certain assumptions, any measure of belief is isomorphic to a probability measure. This theorem, although intended as a justification of the subjectivist interpretation of probability theory, is sometimes presented as an argument for more controversial theses. Of particular interest is the thesis that the only coherent means of representing uncertainty is via the probability calculus. In this paper I examine the logical assumptions of Cox's theorem and I show how these impinge on the philosophical conclusions thought to be supported by the theorem. I show that the more controversial thesis is not supported by Cox's theorem. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

IR as Practical Philosophy: Defining a 'Classical Approach'

This article addresses the centrality of normativity to IR (International Relations) by engaging in an investigation of the meaning of a 'classical' approach (Bull 1969). It demonstrates how a classical approach, properly understood, might provide common ground for IR theorists. The substantive argument is that IR can benefit from reflection on the classical understanding of the relationship between theory and practice, and in particular on the understanding of this relationship provided by philosophical hermeneutics. Philosophical hermeneutics is an approach to the human sciences informed by Aristotle's conception of a practical philosophy. A practical philosophy in the classical sense sees theory as a moral and political inquiry involving a body of knowledge and a philosophy of practice engaging in reflection upon the nature of the good life and the means to achieve it.

Learning mathematics in a classroom community of inquiry

This article considers the question of what specific actions a teacher might take to create a culture of inquiry in a secondary school mathematics classroom. Sociocultural theories of learning provide the framework for examining teaching and learning practices in a single classroom over a two-year period. The notion of the zone of proximal development (ZPD) is invoked as a fundamental framework for explaining learning as increasing participation in a community of practice characterized by mathematical inquiry. The analysis draws on classroom observation and interviews with students and the teacher to show how the teacher established norms and practices that emphasized mathematical sense-making and justification of ideas and arguments and to illustrate the learning practices that students developed in response to these expectations.