Nuclear weapons as obstacles to international security

This article argues that nuclear weapons serve no useful purpose in military calculations; moreover, their continued retention invites the dangers of further proliferation and of accidental use. They are thus defined here as obstacles to, rather than as facilitators of, international security. Seven reasons are presented to support this contention, including an assessment of the moral implications and the strategic limitations of nuclear weapons. Despite these limitations, and the recent commitments made by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals, nuclear weapons remain central to the strategic doctrines of these states. Several reasons are put forward to explain why this retention continues, including the unchanging nature of strategic mindsets, the presence of vested interests, and now, in the case of the USA at least, a renewed reliance on nuclear weapons, regardless of how appropriate and effective such a strategy might be against emerging terrorist or `rogue state' threats.

Promoting an agenda for nuclear weapons elimination: The Canberra Commission and dilemmas of disarmament

This paper examines the role of the Canberra Commission in terms of consolidating and influencing the agenda on international negotiations towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Commission's Report is significant for two main reasons. First, it represents a unique form of disarmament diplomacy by the Australian Government which combined the post-Cold War international climate of security cooperation with the foreign policy aspirations of an activist middle power. Second, the Report refutes the strategic, technological and political arguments against nuclear elimination in a comprehensive and convincing manner, arguing that without elimination, the world faces increased threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This paper thus concludes that the Canberra Commission has been instrumental in strengthening the taboo against the possession, testing or use of nuclear weapons.

Transnational organised crime and international law: The Palermo Convention

The last decade has witnessed a significant growth in transnational organised crime activities. It has also seen multiple efforts by the international community to come to terms with this rise of organised crime and to work towards an international instrument to combat the activities of criminal organisations. In December 2000, the United Nations opened for signature the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2001), also known as the Palermo Convention, a treaty that is supplemented by three protocols on trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, and trafficking in firearms and ammunition. The conclusion of the Convention marks the end of more than eight years of consultations on a universal instrument to criminalise and counteract transnational criminal organisations. This article illustrates the developments that led to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and reflects on the amendments and concessions that have been made to earlier proposals during the elaboration process. This article highlights the strengths of the Convention in the areas of judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance, and the shortcomings of the new Convention, in particular in failing to establish a universal, unequivocal definition of “transnational organized crime”.

A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis

Two nuclear crises recently haunted the Korean peninsula, one in 1993/4, the other in 2002/3. In each case the events-were strikingly similar: North Korea made public its ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty. Then the situation rapidly deteriorated until the peninsular was literally on the verge of war. The dangers of North Korea's actions, often interpreted as nuclear brinkmanship, are evident. and much discussed, but not so the underlying patterns that have shaped the conflict in the first place. This article sheds light on some of them. It examines the role of the United States in the crisis, arguing that Washington's inability to see North Korea as anything but a threatening 'rogue state' seriously hinders both an adequate understanding and possible resolution of the conflict. Particularly significant is the current policy of pre-emptive strikes against rogue states, for it reinforces half a century of American nuclear threats towards North Korea. The problematic role of these threats has been largely obscured, not least because the highly technical discourse of security analysis has managed to present the strategic situation on the peninsula in a manner that attributes responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea's actions, even if the situation is in reality far more complex and interactive.