“Doing” Gender in Context: Household Bargaining and Risk of Divorce in Germany and the United States

Gender relations remain embedded in their sociopolitical context. Compared here using event-history analysis is how household divisions of paid and unpaid labor affect marital stability in the former West Germany, where policy reinforced male breadwinner families, and the United States, where policy remains silent regarding the private sphere. In Germany, any moves away from separate gendered spheres in terms of either wives' relative earnings or husbands' relative participation in housework increase the risk of divorce. In the United States, however, the more stable couples are those that adapt by displaying greater gender equity. These results highlight that policy shapes how gender gets done in the intimate sphere, and that reinforcement of a gendered division of labor may be detrimental to marital stability.

A model of seller holdout

We model a buyer who wishes to combine objects owned by two separate sellers in order to realize higher value. Sellers are able to avoid entering into negotiations with the buyer, so that the order in which they negotiate is endogenous. Holdout occurs if at least one of the sellers is not present in the first round of negotiations. We demonstrate that complementarity of the buyer's technology is a necessary condition for equilibrium holdout. Moreover, a rise in complementarity leads to an increased likelihood of holdout, and an increased efficiency loss. Applications include patents, the land assembly problem, and mergers.

Reserve price commitments in auctions

It is well known that the optimal auction-one that maximizes the seller's expected revenue-can be implemented using a standard auction format with a suitably chosen reserve price. This reserve price is above the seller's value of retaining the object and the mechanism requires a commitment not to sell the object below the reserve. This commitment is what makes the reserve valuable to the seller. However, in practice, a reserve price commits the seller to sell the object if the reserve is reached, but does not commit her to withhold the object from sale if bidding falls short of the reserve. In this note we investigate whether reserve prices remain valuable for the seller when she may negotiate with the highest bidder if the reserve is not met. We show that the value of the reserve price may be completely undermined if the seller is a sufficiently weak bargainer. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Economic theories of the family and discrimination in a social context: Entitlements of Kondh tribal females in India

Economic theories of the family and gender discrimination within the family are examined in the context of Kondh dominated tribal villages in rural western Orissa, India, drawing on results from a survey of 106 wives. The survey involved direct interviews using a structured questionnaire. This article examines the relevance of economic unitary and bargaining theories of the family in this social context, drawing on background literature. Using the survey results, socioeconomic influences on the status of wives within their families are analyzed and the entitlements of female and male children are compared and analyzed. Because of cultural embedding, it is suggested that the relevance of economic theories of the family depend significantly on cultural context. In many cases, it seems that poverty has a negative influence on the social empowerment of females but it is not the only influence nor always a sufficient condition for discrimination against females.

Industrial relations decentralisation and the growth of 12-hour shifts in Australia

In the last two decades, increasing numbers of workplaces in Australia have introduced 12-hour shifts. This increase is due, in part, to government policies aimed at promoting labour flexibility. The purpose of this paper is to examine the cover afforded by the Workplace Relations Act 1996 and other industrial relations legislation in terms of shift-workers’ health and safety. Particular reference is made to the broader social, economic and political context surrounding the introduction and use of 12-hour shifts, as it is this context that shapes the constraints and opportunities facing employers and employees in the work arrangements they choose and how they are negotiated. We conclude that the current system of regulating industrial relations in Australia is largely outcome-focused and inadequate. The bargaining process receives little regulation in terms of considering how changes could affect health and safety in the workplace or how changes might affect individual workers. As a result, the increased introduction of unsafe shiftworking arrangements is a worrying, and likely, prospect.

Alternating offer games and private rulings of the Australian Tax Office

The concept of submitting oneself to a voluntary negotiation is by no means new to big business. Formal bargaining has been quite successful over the years in providing the venue for agents to explore a more logical and mathematical approach to bargaining. However in more recent times external influences have been applied to agents who provide better deals for favored executives. This external influence has displayed itself in taxtion negotiations to the extent that tax office agents have been dismissed for irresponsible conduct. We explore this specific type of negotiation using an alternating offer bargaining game to model the particular influences, which create unfair rulings in negotiations. By the constraints of this systematic mathematical approach to negotiation, we will explore the advantages of a more formal game theoretic approach. In this presentation we will also elaborate on finding Nash Equilibrium in alternating offer games.