Believing badly

This paper explores the grounds upon which moral judgment of a person's beliefs is properly made. The beliefs in question are non-moral beliefs and the objects of moral judgment are individual instances of believing. We argue that instances of believing may be morally wrong on any of three distinct grounds: (i) by constituting a moral hazard, (ii) by being the result of immoral inquiry, or (iii) by arising from vicious inner processes of belief formation. On this way of articulating the basis of moral judgment of belief it becomes clear that rational and epistemic norms do not exhaust the kinds of normative judgment properly made of a person's state of believing. We argue that there are instances of believing that are both rational and true and yet morally wrong.

Mindreading and moral awareness in popular and rejected preschoolers

This study sought to examine links among young children's peer relations, their moral understanding in terms of the ability to distinguish lies from mistakes, and their theory-of-mind development. Based on sociometric measures, 109 children with a mean age of 4.8 years were divided into groups of popular and rejected preschoolers. Rejected children who had a stable mutual friend scored higher on measures of moral understanding and theory of mind than did rejected children without such friendships. Similarly, popular children who had a stable mutual friendship outperformed other popular children on mindreading, although their moral understanding was no better than that of the popular group who lacked mutual friends. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that peer popularity was a significant independent predictor of children's moral understanding after any effects of verbal maturity, age and theory-of-mind were statistically controlled. Moreover, having a reciprocal stable friendship made a significant independent contribution to the explanation of individual differences in mindreading, over and above age and verbal maturity, which also contributed significantly. These results are discussed in terms of conversational, cognitive, and emotional processes in the development of social cognition.

Well-formedness judgment: A comparison of offline and online performance in Broca's aphasics

0na eg rcarmitimcaal tfieca tcuorem opfr ethhee nospieornat iodneafli cdietf i(nAitiCoDn )o ft hthaet frequently co-occurs with Broca’s aphasia is above-chance performance on well-formedness judgment tasks for many syntactic constructions, but impaired performance where syntactic binding of traces to their antecedents occurs. However, the methodologies used to establish this aspect of the performance profile of the ACD have been predominantly offline. Offline well-formedness tasks entail extralinguistic processing (e.g. perception, attention, short-term memory, conscious reflection) in varying amounts and the influence of such processes on parsing mechanisms is yet to be fully established. In order to (a) further understand the role of extra-linguistic processing on parsing, and (b) gain a more direct insight into the online nature of parsing in Broca’s aphasia, 8 subjects underwent a series of wellformedness judgment investigations using both offline and online test batteries. The sentence types and error types used were motivated by three current theories about the nature of the ACD, namely, the Trace-Based Account (Grodzinsky, 2000), the Mapping Hypothesis (Linebarger et al., 1983) and Capacity proposals (e.g. Frazier & Friederici, 1991). The results from the present investigation speak directly to the three aforementioned theories and also demonstrate the important role that extralinguistic processing plays during offline assessment. The clinical implications of the different outcomes from the offline vs. online tasks are also discussed.