Theory of mind and relational complexity

Cognitive complexity and control theory and relational complexity theory attribute developmental changes in theory of mind (TOM) to complexity. In 3 studies, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds performed TOM tasks (false belief, appearance-reality), less complex connections (Level 1 perspective-taking) tasks, and transformations tasks (understanding the effects of location changes and colored filters) with content similar to TOM. There were also predictor tasks at binary-relational and ternary-relational complexity levels, with different content. Consistent with complexity theories: (a) connections and transformations were easier and mastered earlier than TOM; (b) predictor tasks accounted for more than 80% of age-related variance in TOM; and (c) ternary-relational items accounted for TOM variance, before and after controlling for age and binary-relational items. Prediction did not require hierarchically structured predictor tasks.

"mind the gap": The size-distance dissociation in visual neglect is a cueing effect

There is a growing body of evidence that the processes mediating the allocation of spatial attention within objects may be separable from those governing attentional distribution between objects. In the neglect literature, a related proposal has been made regarding the perception of (within-object) sizes and (between-object) distances. This proposal follows observations that, in size-matching and bisection tasks, neglect is more strongly expressed when patients are required to attend to the sizes of discrete objects than to the (unfilled) distances between objects. These findings are consistent with a partial dissociation between size and distance processing, but a simpler alternative must also be considered. Whilst a neglect patient may fail to explore the full extent of a solid stimulus, the estimation of an unfilled distance requires that both endpoints be inspected before the task can be attempted at all. The attentional cueing implicit in distance estimation tasks might thus account for their superior performance by neglect patients. We report two bisection studies that address this issue. The first confirmed, amongst patients with left visual neglect, a reliable reduction of rightward error for unfilled gap stimuli as compared with solid lines. The second study assessed the cause of this reduction, deconfounding the effects of stimulus type (lines vs. gaps) and attentional cueing, by applying an explicit cueing manipulation to line and gap bisection tasks. Under these matched cueing conditions, all patients performed similarly on line and gap bisection tasks, suggesting that the reduction of neglect typically observed for gap stimuli may be attributable entirely to cueing effects. We found no evidence that a spatial extent, once fully attended, is judged any differently according to whether it is filled or unfilled.

Theory-of-mind development in oral deaf children with cochlear implants or conventional hearing aids

Background: In the context of the established finding that theory-of-mind (ToM) growth is seriously delayed in late-signing deaf children, and some evidence of equivalent delays in those learning speech with conventional hearing aids, this study's novel contribution was to explore ToM development in deaf children with cochlear implants. Implants can substantially boost auditory acuity and rates of language growth. Despite the implant, there are often problems socialising with hearing peers and some language difficulties, lending special theoretical interest to the present comparative design. Methods: A total of 52 children aged 4 to 12 years took a battery of false belief tests of ToM. There were 26 oral deaf children, half with implants and half with hearing aids, evenly divided between oral-only versus sign-plus-oral schools. Comparison groups of age-matched high-functioning children with autism and younger hearing children were also included. Results: No significant ToM differences emerged between deaf children with implants and those with hearing aids, nor between those in oral-only versus sign-plus-oral schools. Nor did the deaf children perform any better on the ToM tasks than their age peers with autism. Hearing preschoolers scored significantly higher than all other groups. For the deaf and the autistic children, as well as the preschoolers, rate of language development and verbal maturity significantly predicted variability in ToM, over and above chronological age. Conclusions: The finding that deaf children with cochlear implants are as delayed in ToM development as children with autism and their deaf peers with hearing aids or late sign language highlights the likely significance of peer interaction and early fluent communication with peers and family, whether in sign or in speech, in order to optimally facilitate the growth of social cognition and language.

How primatology can inform us about the evolution of the humand mind

Humans are primates. We have evolved from common ancestors and the evolution of the human body is becoming increasingly clear as the archeological record expands. But for most people the gap between humans and animals lies in the mind, not in the body. And minds do not fossilise. To reconstruct the evolution of mind, scholars have thus increasingly looked to our closest relatives for clues. Here I discuss four ways in which the study of primates may inform such reconstruction: fact-finding, phylogenetic reconstruction, analogy, and regression models. Knowledge about primates can help us bridge the gap. Extinction of our closest relatives, on the other hand, would not only deplete that source of information but also increase the apparent differences between animal and human minds. It is likely that we have a long history of displacing closely related species, including the other hominids, leading us to appear ever more unique.

Theory of mind and mental state discourse during book reading and story-telling tasks

This article presents three studies conducted in Canada and Australia that relate theory of mind (ToM) development to mental state discourse. In Study 1, mental state discourse was examined while parents and their 5-7-year-old children jointly read a storybook which had a surprise ending about the identity of the main character. Comments specific to the mental states of the story characters and discourse after the book had ended were positively related to children's ToM, and this was due to parent elaborations. Studies 2 and 3 examined children's mental state discourse during storytelling tasks, and in both, mental state discourse of children during narrative was concurrently related to ToM performance. While research has shown that mental state discourse of parents is related to children's ToM acquisition, the current research indicates that children's spontaneous use of mental state language examined outside of the interactional context is also a strong correlate.

Mind and body: Concepts of human cognition, physiology and false belief in children with autism or typical development

This study examined theory of mind (ToM) and concepts of human biology (eyes, heart, brain, lungs and mind) in a sample of 67 children, including 25 high functioning children with autism (age 6-13), plus age-matched and preschool comparison groups. Contrary to Baron-Cohen [1989, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19(4), 579-600], most children with autism correctly understood the functions of the brain (84%) and the mind (64%). Their explanations were predominantly mentalistic. They outperformed typically developing preschoolers in understanding inner physiological (heart, lungs) and cognitive (brain, mind) systems, and scored as high as age-matched typical children. Yet, in line with much previous ToM research, most children with autism (60%) failed false belief, and their ToM performance was unrelated to their understanding of. human biology. Results were discussed in relation to neurobiological and social-experiential accounts of the ToM deficit in autism.

Steps in theory-of-mind development for children with deafness or autism

Prior research demonstrates that understanding theory of mind (ToM) is seriously and similarly delayed in late-signing deaf children and children with autism. Are these children simply delayed in timing relative to typical children, or do they demonstrate different patterns of development? The current research addressed this question by testing 145 children (ranging from 3 to 13 years) with deafness, autism, or typical development using a ToM scale. Results indicate that all groups followed the same sequence of steps, up to a point, but that children with autism showed an importantly different sequence of understandings (in the later steps of the progression) relative to all other groups.

Making decisions with the future in mind: Developmental and comparative identification of mental time travel

Mechanisms that produce behavior which increase future survival chances provide an adaptive advantage. The flexibility of human behavior is at least partly the result of one such mechanism, our ability to travel mentally in time and entertain potential future scenarios. We can study mental time travel in children using language. Current results suggest that key developments occur between the ages of three to five. However, linguistic performance can be misleading as language itself is developing. We therefore advocate the use of methodologies that focus on future-oriented action. Mental time travel required profound changes in humans' motivational system, so that current behavior could be directed to secure not just present, but individually anticipated future needs. Such behavior should be distinguishable from behavior based on current drives, or on other mechanisms. We propose an experimental paradigm that provides subjects with an opportunity to act now to satisfy a need not currently experienced. This approach may be used to assess mental time travel in nonhuman animals. We conclude by describing a preliminary study employing an adaptation of this paradigm for children. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Telling the story of theory of mind: Deaf and hearing children's narratives and mental state understanding

Theory of mind (ToM) was examined in late-signing deaf children in two studies by using standard tests and measures of spontaneous talk about inner states of perception, affect and cognition during storytelling. In Study 1, there were 21 deaf children aged 6 to 11 years and 13 typical-hearing children matched with the deaf by chronological age. In Study 2, there were 17 deaf children aged 6 to 12 years and 17 typical-hearing preschoolers aged 4 to 5 years who were matched with the deaf by ToM test performance. In addition to replicating the consistently reported finding of poor performance on standard false belief tests by late-signing deaf children, significant correlations emerged in both studies between deaf children's ToM test scores and their spontaneous narrative talk about imaginative cognition (e.g. 'pretend'). In Study 2, with a new set of purpose-built pictures that evoked richer and more complex mentalistic narration than the published picture book of Study 1, results of multiple regression analyses showed that children's narrative talk about imaginative cognition was uniquely important, over and above hearing status and talking of other kinds of mental states, in predicting ToM scores. The same was true of children's elaborated narrative talk using utterances that either spelt out thoughts, explained inner states or introduced contrastives. In addition, results of a Guttman scalograrn analysis in Study 2 suggested a consistent sequence in narrative and standard test performance by deaf and hearing children that went from (1) narrative mention of visible (affective or perceptual) mental states only, along with FB failure, to (2) narrative mention of cognitive states along with (1), to (3) elaborated narrative talk about inner states along with (2), and finally to (4) simple and elaborated narrative talk about affective/perceptual and cognitive states along with FIB test success. Possible explanations for this performance ordering, as well as for the observed correlations in both studies between ToM test scores and narrative variables, were considered.

Theory of mind and central coherence in adults with high-functioning autism or Asperger syndrome

The study investigated theory of mind and central coherence abilities in adults with high-functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger syndrome (AS) using naturalistic tasks. Twenty adults with HTA/AS correctly answered significantly fewer theory of mind questions than 20 controls on a forced-choice response task. On a narrative task, there were no differences in the proportion of mental state words between the two groups, although the participants with HFA/AS were less inclined to provide explanations for characters' mental states. No between-group differences existed on the central coherence questions of the forced-choice response task, and the participants with HTA/AS included an equivalent proportion of explanations for non-mental state phenomena in their narratives as did controls. These results support the theory of mind deficit account of autism spectrum disorders, and suggest that difficulties in mental state attribution cannot be exclusively attributed to weak central coherence.