Responsibility to protect or Trojan Horse? The crisis in darfur and humanitarian intervention after Iraq

What does the world's engagement with the unfolding crisis in Darfur tell us about the impact of the Iraq war on the norm of humanitarian intervention? Is a global consensus about a "responsibility to protect" more or less likely? There are at least three potential answers to these questions. Some argue that the merging of strategic interests and humanitarian goods amplified by the intervention in Afghanistan makes it more likely that the world's most powerful states will act to prevent or halt humanitarian crises. Others insist that the widespread perception that the United States and its allies "abused" humanitarian justifications to legitimate its invasion of Iraq has set back efforts to build a global consensus about humanitarian action. A third group argues that the "responsibility to protect" inhibits the potential for abuse and, as a result, consensus is likely to strengthen post-Iraq for precisely this reason. Through a detailed study of the international engagement with Darfur, I suggest that the latter two arguments have merit but need to be adjusted. I argue that the humanitarian intervention norm has changed in two subtle ways. First, while the strength of the norm itself has not changed, the credibility of the United States and U.K. as "norm carriers" has been significantly undermined. Second, while the "responsibility to protect" has been invoked to support international activism, it has also re-legitimated anti-interventionist arguments.

The UN Security Council and the question of humanitarian intervention in Darfur

This article explores the different moral and legal arguments used by protagonists in the debate about whether or not to conduct a humanitarian intervention in Darfur. The first section briefly outlines four moral and legal positions on whether there is (and should be) a right and/or duty of humanitarian intervention: communitarianism, restrictionist and counter-restrictionist legal positivism and liberal cosmopolitanism. The second section then provides an overview of the Security Council's debate about responding to Darfur's crisis, showing how its policy was influenced by both normative concerns and hard-nosed political calculations. The article concludes by asking what Darfur's case reveals about the legitimacy and likelihood of humanitarian intervention in such catastrophes and the role of the UN Security Council as the primary authorising body for the use of international force. The authors argue that this case demonstrates that for the cosmopolitan/counter-restrictionist case to prevail pivotal states need to put humanitarian emergencies on the global agenda and express a willingness to act without Council authorisation, though the question of how to proceed in cases where the Council is deadlocked remains vexed.

Whither the responsibility to protect? Humanitarian intervention and the 2005 World Summit

At the 2005 World Summit, the world's leaders committed themselves to the "responsibility to protect", recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world's most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world's states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN's High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.

Humanitarian responsibilities and interventionist claims in international society

This article calls for a widening of the debate about humanitarian intervention to incorporate insights from constructivism, 'Welsh School' Critical Security Studies, and critical approaches to Third World International Relations. After identifying a series of problems with the contemporary debate, which is dominated by the English School, it calls for a broadening of the concept of intervention and suggests a need to rethink the meaning of humanitarianism and terms such as the 'supreme humanitarian emergency'.

The responsibility to protect and the crisis in Darfur

Governments that have endorsed the 'sovereignty as responsibility' approach have shown little inclination to protect civilians suffering at the hands of their own government in the Sudanese province of Darfur. After providing an overview of Darfur's crisis and international society's feeble response, we explore why the strongest advocates of 'sovereignty as responsibility', the NATO and EU states, failed to seriously contemplate military intervention. We suggest that three main factors help explain the West's unwillingness to intervene in Darfur: increased scepticism about the West's humanitarian interventionism, especially after the invasion of Iraq; Western strategic interests in Sudan; and the relationship between the crisis in Darfur and Sudan's other civil wars. We conclude that the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention remains weak and strongly contested, and that advocates of the 'responsibility to protect' approach have yet to persuade their governments to help save populations in danger.

The Society of States under siege? An English School perspective on the emergence of global civil society

In this article I critically examine the theoretical and empirical relationship between world society, whereby global civil society is taken to be its physical or empirical counterpart, and the society of states. This relationship is typically portrayed as contradictory or confrontational, and I contend that this mainstream perspective is reliant on a superficial analysis of the relationship. If one examines the deeper dynamics, viewed in their contemporary international normative context, then one can identify the more constructive and permissive aspects of the relationship. Rather than being wholly incompatible I argue that world society and international society are mutually constitutive and mutually dependent regimes, whose relationship is more often marked by cooperation than by conflict. English School theory provides the conceptual framework for this analysis. The relationship between international and world society presents a core ontological tension within this theory, and again they tend to occupy polarised positions. A synthesis of four international theories - pluralist international society theory, solidarist international society theory, critical international theory, and the discourse of global civil society - informs the hypothesis that the relationship can be normatively and empirically reconciled. In order to empirically support this explanation I analyse two phenomena in world politics - transnational advocacy networks and humanitarian intervention - where there is an apparent tension between international and world society.

Ethics and intervention: The 'humanitarian exception' and the problem of abuse in the case of Iraq

This article investigates the ethics of intervention and explores the decision to invade Iraq. It begins by arguing that while positive international law provides an important framework for understanding and debating the legitimacy of war, it does not cover the full spectrum of moral reasoning on issues of war and peace. To that end, after briefly discussing the two primary legal justifications for war (implied UN authorization and pre-emptive self-defence), and finding them wanting, it asks whether there is a moral 'humanitarian exceptions to this rule grounded in the 'just war' tradition. The article argues that two aspects of the broad tradition could be used to make a humanitarian case for war: the 'holy war' tradition and classical just war thinking based on natural law. The former it finds problematic, while the latter it argues provides a moral space to justify the use of force to halt gross breaches of natural law. Although such an approach may provide a moral justification for war, it also opens the door to abuse. It was this very problem that legal positivism from Vattel onwards was designed to address. As a result, the article argues that natural law and legal positivist arguments should be understood as complementary sets of ideas whose sometimes competing claims must be balanced in relation to particular cases. Therefore, although natural law may open a space for justifying the invasion of Iraq on humanitarian terms, legal positivism strictly limits that right. Ignoring this latter fact, as happened in the Iraq case, opens the door to abuse.