Popper and his Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: a close shave for the Law of Gravitation?

Knowledge of residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus in the early 1840s did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation but instead to the discovery of Neptune in 1846. Karl Popper asserts that this case is atypical of science and that the law of gravitation was at least prima facie falsified by these perturbations. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position I call, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF). Further, on the evidence the law was not prima facie false and was not generally considered so by astronomers at the time. Many of Popper's commentators (Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and others) presuppose WPF and their views on this case and its implications for scientific rationality and method suffer from this same defect.

Thomasius on the toleration of heresy

Over two thousand years the Christian Church identified a wider range and a greater number of heresies than most other religions and, when secular authorities did not protected the heretics, took drastic measures to persuade the heretic to recant and to extirpate the false doctrine. Heresy, of course, is a word like a box [End Page 201] that at different times may hold many different ideas and so some articles are dealing with definitions and identifications that are not the same. The editors suggest that the articles show a profound change in culture in the eighteenth century which means that present day scholars can barely imagine the mind-set that produced medieval attitudes to heresy. This is the task some of the authors have set themselves while others seek to explain how the change came about as part of the historical search for truth.

Goodman and Putnam on the making of worlds

Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.

The effects of viscous loading of the human forearm flexors on the stability of coordination

This experiment investigated whether the stability of rhythmic unimanual movements is primarily a function of perceptual/spatial orientation or neuro-mechanical in nature. Eight participants performed rhythmic flexion and extension movements of the left wrist for 30 s at a frequency of 2.25 Hz paced by an auditory metronome. Each participant performed 8 flex-on-the-beat trials and 8 extend-on-the-beat trials in one of two load conditions, loaded and unload. In the loaded condition, a servo-controlled torque motor was used to apply a small viscous load that resisted the flexion phase of the movement only. Both the amplitude and frequency of the movement generated in the loaded and unloaded conditions were statistically equivalent. However, in the loaded condition movements in which participants were required to flex-on-the-beat became less stable (more variable) while extend-on-the-beat movements remained unchanged compared with the unload condition. The small alteration in required muscle force was sufficient to result in reliable changes in movement stability even a situation where the movement kinematics were identical. These findings support the notion that muscular constraints, independent of spatial dependencies, can be sufficiently strong to reliably influence coordination in a simple unimanual task.