Maintenance Strategies for used equipment under lease

Abstract: Purpose – The aim of this research is to determine the optimal upgrade and preventive maintenance actions that minimize the total expected cost (maintenance costs+penalty costs). Design/methodology/approach – The problem is a four-parameter optimization with two parameters being k-dimensional. The optimal solution is obtained by using a four-stage approach where at each stage a one-parameter optimization is solved. Findings – Upgrading action is an extra option before the lease of used equipment, in addition to preventive maintenance action. Upgrading action makes equipment younger and preventive maintenance action lowers the ROCOF. Practical implications – There is a growing trend towards leasing equipment rather than owning it. The lease contract contains penalties if the equipment fails often and repairs are done within reasonable time period. This implies that the lessor needs to look at optimal preventive maintenance strategies in the case of new equipment lease, and upgrade actions plus preventive maintenance in the case of used equipment lease. The paper deals with this topic and is of great significant to business involved with leasing equipment. Originality/value – Nowadays many organizations are interested in leasing equipment and outsourcing maintenance. The model in this paper addresses the preventive maintenance problem for leased equipment. It provides an approach to dealing with this problem.

Optimal periodic preventive maintenance policy for leased equipment

For leased equipment the lessor incurs penalty costs for failures occurring over the lease period and for not rectifying such failures within a specified time limit. Through preventive maintenance actions the penalty costs can be reduced but this is achieved at the expense of increased maintenance costs. The paper looks at a periodic preventive maintenance policy which achieves a tradeoff between the penalty and maintenance costs. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Optimal preventive maintenance of leased equipment with corrective minimal repairs

For leased equipment, the lessor carries out the maintenance of the equipment. Usually, the contract of lease specifies the penalty for equipment failures and for repairs not being carried out within specified time limits. This implies that optimal preventive maintenance policies must take these penalty costs into account and properly traded against the cost of preventive maintenance actions. The costs associated with failures are high as unplanned corrective maintenance actions are costly and the resulting penalties due to lease contract terms being violated. The paper develops a model to determine the optimal parameters of a preventive maintenance policy that takes into account all these costs to minimize the total expected cost to the lessor for new item lease. The parameters of the policy are (i) the number of preventive maintenance actions to be carried out over the lease period, (ii) the time instants for such actions, and (iii) the level of action. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

All's fair in love and war - but not contract

Changes to Queensland's unfair terms in consumer contracts expected - nature of the changes outlined - protections given to consumers, with respect to unfair contracts, in Victoria and the United Kingdom.

Extending choreography with business contract constraints

Business contracts play a central role in governing commercial interactions between organizations. It is increasingly recognized that business contract conditions need to be closely linked to internal and external business processes, both to reduce the risk of contract violations and to ensure compliance with legislative regimes. Recent research has proposed contract languages allowing the specification of obligations, permissions and prohibitions in business contracts. Business processes that cross-organizational boundaries can be specified in choreography and coordination languages but these do not provide appropriate abstractions for contract constraints. In this paper, we examine the transformation of contract constraints in a business contract language into expressions in a choreography language. An example cross-organizational process is presented, along with a specification of the process in a choreography language and a specification of a set of contract conditions for the process in a business contract language. The contract terms are then translated into choreography expressions that govern the process to ensure compliance. Subsequent discussion explores a number of business and technology issues related to the results. We conclude that cross-organizational business processes can be monitored and enforced according to business contract specifications through the transformation of a contract definition to constraints on process behavior.

Effects of psychological contract breach on performance of IT employees: The mediating role of affective commitment

In this study, we investigated the relationships between psychological contract breach, affective commitment, and two types of employee performance (i.e. civic virtue behaviour and in-role performance). It was predicted that an experience of contract breach can severely hurt the affective commitment of the employees and this, in turn, results in poor in-role performance and less civic virtue behaviours. Results revealed that affective commitment had differential mediating effects on the two types of employee performance. That is, affective commitment mediated the relationship between breach and self-reported and supervisor-rated civic virtue, but not the relationship between breach and in-role performance.

Workplace familism and psychological contract breach in the Philippines

The present study addresses the call for theory-based investigations on workplace familism. It contributes to the literature by proposing and testing the moderating role of workplace familism between psychological contract breach and civic virtue behaviour. We surveyed 267 full-time employees and found main effects of both types of workplace familism (i.e. workplace organisational and workplace supervisor familism) and breach of relational obligations on civic virtue behaviour. Workplace supervisor familism also moderated the relationship between breach and civic virtue behaviour, with the negative relationship between breach and civic virtue behaviour stronger when workplace supervisor familism was high. This suggests that employees with a high level of workplace supervisor familism may feel a sense of betrayal and, therefore, respond more negatively to contract breach. Implications for practice and directions for future research are discussed.