Bimanual aiming and overt attention: one law for two hands

Reaching to interact with an object requires a compromise between the speed of the limb movement and the required end-point accuracy. The time it takes one hand to move to a target in a simple aiming task can be predicted reliably from Fitts' law, which states that movement time is a function of a combined measure of amplitude and accuracy constraints (the index of difficulty, ID). It has been assumed previously that Fitts' law is violated in bimanual aiming movements to targets of unequal ID. We present data from two experiments to show that this assumption is incorrect: if the attention demands of a bimanual aiming task are constant then the movements are well described by a Fitts' law relationship. Movement time therefore depends not only on ID but on other task conditions, which is a basic feature of Fitts' law. In a third experiment we show that eye movements are an important determinant of the attention demands in a bimanual aiming task. The results from the third experiment extend the findings of the first two experiments and show that bimanual aiming often relies on the strategic co-ordination of separate actions into a seamless behaviour. A number of the task specific strategies employed by the adult human nervous system were elucidated in the third experiment. The general strategic pattern observed in the hand trajectories was reflected by the pattern of eye movements recorded during the experiment. The results from all three experiments demonstrate that eye movements must be considered as an important constraint in bimanual aiming tasks.

Excitability changes in human forearm corticospinal projections and spinal reflex pathways during rhythmic voluntary movement of the opposite limb

Rhythmic movements brought about by the contraction of muscles on one side of the body give rise to phase-locked changes in the excitability of the homologous motor pathways of the opposite limb. Such crossed facilitation should favour patterns of bimanual coordination in which homologous muscles are engaged simultaneously, and disrupt those in which the muscles are activated in an alternating fashion. In order to examine these issues, we obtained responses to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), to stimulation of the cervicomedullary junction (cervicomedullary-evoked potentials, CMEPs), to peripheral nerve stimulation (H-reflexes and f-waves), and elicited stretch reflexes in the relaxed right flexor carpi radialis (FCR) muscle during rhythmic (2 Hz) flexion and extension movements of the opposite (left) wrist. The potentials evoked by TMS in right FCR were potentiated during the phases of movement in which the left FCR was most strongly engaged. In contrast, CMEPs were unaffected by the movements of the opposite limb. These results suggest that there was systematic variation of the excitability of the motor cortex ipsilateral to the moving limb. H-reflexes and stretch reflexes recorded in right FCR were modulated in phase with the activation of left FCR. As the f-waves did not vary in corresponding fashion, it appears that the phasic modulation of the H-reflex was mediated by presynaptic inhibition of Ia afferents. The observation that both H-reflexes and f-waves were depressed markedly during movements of the opposite indicates that there may also have been postsynaptic inhibition or disfacilitation of the largest motor units. Our findings indicate that the patterned modulation of excitability in motor pathways that occurs during rhythmic movements of the opposite limb is mediated primarily by interhemispheric interactions between cortical motor areas.

Popper and his Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: a close shave for the Law of Gravitation?

Knowledge of residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus in the early 1840s did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation but instead to the discovery of Neptune in 1846. Karl Popper asserts that this case is atypical of science and that the law of gravitation was at least prima facie falsified by these perturbations. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position I call, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF). Further, on the evidence the law was not prima facie false and was not generally considered so by astronomers at the time. Many of Popper's commentators (Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and others) presuppose WPF and their views on this case and its implications for scientific rationality and method suffer from this same defect.