Popper's Explications of Ad hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content, and Scientific Practice

Popper's explications of 'ad hoc' in relation to hypotheses and explanations turn out to be either trivial, confused or mistaken. One such explication I discuss at length is circularity; another is reduction in empirical content. I argue that non-circularity is preferable to non-ad hocness for an acceptable explanation or explanans, and I isolate some persistent errors in his analysis. Second, Popper is barking up the wrong tree in proscribing reductions in empirical content in novel hypotheses. Such reductions may constitute scientific progress. He fails to show that ad hoc hypothesis are the threat to science he claims.

Popper and his Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: a close shave for the Law of Gravitation?

Knowledge of residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus in the early 1840s did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation but instead to the discovery of Neptune in 1846. Karl Popper asserts that this case is atypical of science and that the law of gravitation was at least prima facie falsified by these perturbations. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position I call, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF). Further, on the evidence the law was not prima facie false and was not generally considered so by astronomers at the time. Many of Popper's commentators (Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and others) presuppose WPF and their views on this case and its implications for scientific rationality and method suffer from this same defect.

What is the Problem of Ad Hoc Hypotheses?

The received view of an ad hoc hypothesis is that it accounts for only the observation(s) it was designed to account for, and so non-adhocness is generally held to be necessary or important for an introduced hypothesis or modification to a theory. Attempts by Popper and several others to convincingly explicate this view, however, prove to be unsuccessful or of doubtful value, and familiar and firmer criteria for evaluating the hypotheses or modified theories so classified are characteristically available. These points are obscured largely because the received view fails to adequately separate psychology from methodology or to recognise ambiguities in the use of 'ad hoc'.

Design, Science and Conceptual Analysis

Philosophers expend considerable effort on the analysis of concepts, but the value of such work is not widely appreciated. This paper principally analyses some arguments, beliefs, and presuppositions about the nature of design and the relations between design and science common in the literature to illustrate this point, and to contribute to the foundations of design theory.

Ockham's Razor: The Discovery of Neptune

The discovery of Neptune in September 1846 is a good example of scientific rationality but it has proven to be surprisingly difficult to explain how this is so from the perspective of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and several other commentators who have been influenced by these thinkers. I try briefly to explain how to avoid these difficulties and understand the achievement of the astronomers who predicted the location of the new planet, Urbain J. J. Leverrier and John Couch Adams.

Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction

Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, say, counter-corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-corroborationist alternative is beside the point. However, as whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction since we are not required to act in the past, and his argument for rejecting the second presupposes induction.