Market failure in long-term private health insurance markets: a proposed solution

Recently, private health insurance rates have declined in many countries. In places requiring community rating in their health insurance premiums, a major cause is age-based adverse selection. However, even in countries without community rating, a de facto type of partial community rating tends to occur. In this note, a modified version of Pauly et al.'s guaranteed renewability model, which addresses the problem of age-based adverse selection (Pauly et al., 1995) is presented. Their model is extended from three to 35 periods. Also, probabilities are allowed to increase by age for low-risk types using actual age-based probabilities. This extension of their work shows that private health insurance contracts available stray far from optimal contracts that deal with age-based adverse selection. This suggests that government actions to affect private insurance options are warranted.

Lifetime Subsidies in Australian Private Health Insurance Markets with Community Rating

This paper considers the problem of inducing low-risk individuals of all ages to buy private health insurance in Australia. Our proposed subsidy scheme improves upon the age-based penalty scheme under the current "Australian Lifetime Cover" (LTC) scheme. We generate an alternative subsidy profile that obviates adverse selection in private health insurance markets with mandated, age-based, community rating. Our proposal is novel in that we generate subsidies that are both risk- and age-specific, based upon actual risk probabilities. The approach we take may prove useful in other jurisdictions where the extant law mandates community rating in private health insurance markets. Furthermore, our approach is useful in jurisdictions that seek to maintain private insurance to complement existing universal public systems.

Lifetime cover in private insurance markets

In the last few decades, private health insurance rates have declined in many countries. In countries and states with community rating, a major cause is adverse selection. In order to address age-based adverse selection, Australia has recently begun a novel approach which imposes stiff penalties for buying private insurance later in life, when expected costs are higher. In this paper, we analyze Australiarsquos Lifetime Cover in the context of a modified version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). We allow empirically-based probabilities to increase by age for low-risk types. The model highlights the shortcomings of the Australian plan. Based on empirically-based probabilities of illness, we predict that Lifetime Cover will not arrest adverse selection. The model has many policy implications for government regulation encouraging long-term health coverage.

Never-married childless women in Australia: Health and social circumstances in older age

A growing proportion of women reach older age without having married or having children. Assumptions that these older women are lonely, impoverished, and high users of social and health services are based on little evidence. This paper uses data from the Older cohort of the Australian Longitudinal Study on Women's Health to describe self-reported demographics, physical and emotional health, and use of services among 10,108 women aged 73-78, of whom 2.7% are never-married and childless. The most striking characteristic of this group is their high levels of education, which are associated with fewer reported financial difficulties and higher rates of private health insurance. There are few differences in self-reported physical or emotional health or use of health services between these and other groups of older women. Compared with older married women with children, they make higher use of formal services such as home maintenance and meal services, and are also more likely to provide volunteer services and belong to social groups. Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that these women are a problem group. Rather, it seems that their life experiences and opportunities prepare them for a successful and productive older age. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Health system reform in Mexico 5: Assessing the effect of the 2001-06 Mexican health reform: an interim report card

Since 2001, Mexico has been designing, legislating, and implementing a major health-system reform. A key component was the creation of Seguro Popular, which is intended to expand insurance coverage over 7 years to uninsured people, nearly half the total population at the start of 2001. The reform included five actions: legislation of entitlement per family affiliated which, with full implementation, will increase public spending on health by 0.8-1.0% of gross domestic product; creation of explicit benefits packages; allocation of monies to decentralised state ministries of health in proportion to number of families affiliated; division of federal resources flowing to states into separate funds for personal and non-personal health services; and creation of a fund to protect families against catastrophic health expenditures. Using the WHO health-systems framework, we used a wide range of datasets to assess the effect of this reform on different dimensions of the health system. Key findings include: affiliation is preferentially reaching the poor and the marginalised communities; federal non-social security expenditure in real per-head terms increased by 38% from 2000 to 2005; equity of public-health expenditure across states improved; Seguro Popular affiliates used more inpatient and outpatient services than uninsured people; effective coverage of 11 interventions has improved between 2000 and 2005-06; inequalities in effective coverage across states and wealth deciles has decreased over this period; catastrophic expenditures for Seguro Popular affiliates are lower than for uninsured people even though use of services has increased. We present some lessons for Mexico based on this interim evaluation and explore implications for other countries considering health reforms.