The philosophical significance of Cox's theorem

Cox's theorem states that, under certain assumptions, any measure of belief is isomorphic to a probability measure. This theorem, although intended as a justification of the subjectivist interpretation of probability theory, is sometimes presented as an argument for more controversial theses. Of particular interest is the thesis that the only coherent means of representing uncertainty is via the probability calculus. In this paper I examine the logical assumptions of Cox's theorem and I show how these impinge on the philosophical conclusions thought to be supported by the theorem. I show that the more controversial thesis is not supported by Cox's theorem. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

No(i)stalgia: On the impossibility of recognising noise in the present

Starting from a comparison between the process of writing by hand and writing to screen, this paper contends that there is a continuity between the former, apparently archaic form of writing, and the latter, supposedly more modern form of writing. It will be suggested that, rather than being truly archaic, writing by hand perhaps constitutes a nostalgic act which attempts to bypass the perceived virtuality of the postmodern condition. As such, it will be claimed, via Baudrillard, that nostalgia of this kind is a type of hyper-simulacrum that relies on a misinterpretation of the noise created by the very act of expression. It will be claimed, however, that if interpreted without the sort of wilful misinterpretation to which noise often falls prey, many kinds of noise grafted onto contemporary cultural objects bear testimony to a certain continuity across historical eras as well as to the fact that we are ultimately incapable of recognising many cultural products' noise (and thus the products themselves in their entirety) in their own era. This paper therefore calls for a noisy theory which, analysing the world from an immanent position, would acknowledge the impossibility of full knowledge of the sign

Axiomatisation of an Interval Calculus for Theorem Proving

We provide an axiomatisation of the Timed Interval Calculus, a set-theoretic notation for expressing properties of time intervals. We implement the axiomatisation in the Ergo theorem prover in order to allow the machine-checked proof of laws for reasoning about predicates expressed using interval operators. These laws can be then used in the machine-assisted verification of real-time applications.