The philosophical significance of Cox's theorem

Cox's theorem states that, under certain assumptions, any measure of belief is isomorphic to a probability measure. This theorem, although intended as a justification of the subjectivist interpretation of probability theory, is sometimes presented as an argument for more controversial theses. Of particular interest is the thesis that the only coherent means of representing uncertainty is via the probability calculus. In this paper I examine the logical assumptions of Cox's theorem and I show how these impinge on the philosophical conclusions thought to be supported by the theorem. I show that the more controversial thesis is not supported by Cox's theorem. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Axiomatisation of an Interval Calculus for Theorem Proving

We provide an axiomatisation of the Timed Interval Calculus, a set-theoretic notation for expressing properties of time intervals. We implement the axiomatisation in the Ergo theorem prover in order to allow the machine-checked proof of laws for reasoning about predicates expressed using interval operators. These laws can be then used in the machine-assisted verification of real-time applications.