Stochastic dynamic programming for election timing: A game theory approach

In this paper, we consider dynamic programming for the election timing in the majoritarian parliamentary system such as in Australia, where the government has a constitutional right to call an early election. This right can give the government an advantage to remain in power for as long as possible by calling an election, when its popularity is high. On the other hand, the opposition's natural objective is to gain power, and it will apply controls termed as "boosts" to reduce the chance of the government being re-elected by introducing policy and economic responses. In this paper, we explore equilibrium solutions to the government, and the opposition strategies in a political game using stochastic dynamic programming. Results are given in terms of the expected remaining life in power, call and boost probabilities at each time at any level of popularity.

Knowledge about a Species' Conservation Status and Funding for its Preservation: Analysis

Using a species' population to measure its conservation status, this paper explores how increased knowledge about a species' status changes the public's willingness to donate funds for its conservation. This is based on the behavioral relationship between the level of donations and a species' conservation status satisfying general mathematical properties. This level of donation increases, on average, with greater knowledge of a species' conservation status if it is endangered, but falls if it is secure. Modelling enables individuals' demand for extra information about the conservation status of species to be specified. While this model may suggest that conservation bodies could boost funds for conservation of species by exaggerating species' endangerment, such a strategy is shown to be potentially counterproductive. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Leading theory: Bourdieu and the field of educational leadership. An introduction and overview to this special issue

Bourdieu … makes it possible to explain how the actions of principals are always contextual, since their interests vary with issue, location, time, school mix, composition of staff and so on. This 'identity' perspective points at a different kind of research about principal practice: to understand the game and its logic requires an analysis of the situated everyday rather than abstractions that claim truth in all instances and places. (Thomson 2001a: 14)