Supreme Emergencies and the protection of non-combatants in war

Is it ever justifiable to target non-combatants deliberately? This article assesses Michael Walzer's claim that the deliberate targeting of non-combatants may be justifiable during 'supreme emergencies', a view that has received some support but that has elicited little debate. It argues that the supreme emergencies exception to the prohibition on targeting non-combatants is problematic for at least four reasons. First, its utilitarianism contradicts Walzer's wider ethics of war based on a conception of human rights. Second, the exception may undermine the principle of non-combatant immunity. Third, it is based on a historical fallacy. Finally, it is predicated on a strategic fallacy-the idea that killing noncombatants can win wars. The case for rejecting the exception, however, has been opposed by those who persuasively argue that it is wrong to tie leaders' hands when they confront supreme emergencies. The final part of the article addresses this question and suggests that the principle of proportionality may give political leaders room for manoeuvre in supreme emergencies without permitting them deliberately to target non-combatants.

Pace of Civil Litigation in the Queensland Supreme Court

The overriding philosophy of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 in Queensland is to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the issues in a civil proceeding at minimum expense. The court is enjoined to apply the rules to avoid undue delay, expense and technicality. Parties impliedly undertake to the court and each other to proceed expeditiously. These rules adopt management theories developed to contain delay and cost in the civil justice system. A survey was designed to determine whether the overriding objective is being achieved in practice. The results indicate a reduction in the time from initiation of a proceeding to termination as compared to a sample of similar cases determined under the repealed Rules of the Supreme Court.