Why do US banks borrow from the Fed? A fresh look at the ‘reluctance’ phenomenon

The role of several theoretical factors in determining the demand of US banks for borrowed reserves from the Fed is empirically investigated. The main objective is to isolate the candidate(s) most likely responsible for the recent observed phenomenon of banks reluctance to borrow from the Fed, particularly since the mid-1980s. The results indicate that the declining number of banks due to mergers and consolidations holds much of the weight for explaining the weakened demand for borrowed reserves since the mid-1980s. Consistent evidence is found suggesting that US banks may have been unlawfully exploiting the discount window service for profit-taking purposes. This finding proves credible and suggests the need for further loan scrutiny at the Federal discount window.

A theory for optimal monitoring of marine reserves

Monitoring of marine reserves has traditionally focused on the task of rejecting the null hypothesis that marine reserves have no impact on the population and community structure of harvested populations. We consider the role of monitoring of marine reserves to gain information needed for management decisions. In particular we use a decision theoretic framework to answer the question: how long should we monitor the recovery of an over-fished stock to determine the fraction of that stock to reserve? This exposes a natural tension between the cost (in terms of time and money) of additional monitoring, and the benefit of more accurately parameterizing a population model for the stock, that in turn leads to a better decision about the optimal size for the reserve with respect to harvesting. We found that the optimal monitoring time frame is rarely more than 5 years. A higher economic discount rate decreased the optimal monitoring time frame, making the expected benefit of more certainty about parameters in the system negligible compared with the expected gain from earlier exploitation.