Optimal debt, endogenous fertility, and human capital externalities in a model with altruistic bequests

and human capital externalities. Because of such externalities, education investment is too low and fertility is too high. While education subsidies are the conventional means to deal with these problems, we show that the optimal policy also comprises debt even when distortionary taxes are used. The reason is that debt tips the usual trade-off between children's quantity and quality in favor of the latter by increasing the bequest cost of children. The optimal debt-output ratio exceeds 10% for plausible parameterization. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Reinforcing the glass ceiling: The consequences of hostile sexism for female managerial candidates

Previous research has established that benevolent sexism is related to the negative evaluation of women who violate specific norms for behavior. Research has yet to document the causal impact of hostile sexism on evaluations of individual targets. Correlational evidence and ambivalent sexism theory led us to predict that hostile sexism would be associated with negative evaluations of a female candidate for a masculine-typed occupational role. Participants completed the ASI (P. Glick & S. T. Fiske, 1996) and evaluated a curriculum vitae from either a male or female candidate. Higher hostile sexism was significantly associated with more negative evaluations of the female candidate and with lower recommendations that she be employed as a manager. Conversely, higher hostile sexism was significantly associated with higher recommendations that a male candidate should be employed as a manager. Benevolent sexism was unrelated to evaluations and recommendations in this context. The findings support the hypothesis that hostile, but not benevolent, sexism results in negativity toward individual women who pose a threat to men's status in the workplace.

Second-best public debt with human capital externalities

This paper studies optinnal public debt in a dynastic model with human capital externalities that cause human capital investment (fertility) to be below (above) its socially optimal level. By reducing fertility and raising human capital investment, the optimal debt can exceed 10% of output for plausible parameterizations.