Postmaterial values and age: The case of Australia

Inglehart's thesis of value change is one of the most widely discussed accounts of social and political change in advanced Western nations. This article offers a critique of Inglehart's thesis and a clarification of the Australian case. While critics of Inglehart have attacked the validity of his values measures, or sought to improve them, we use Inglehart's own values index to show that even if-as Inglehart claims-his measures are valid, the age/values predictions do not hold as the theory suggests in Australia. In a recent article, Inglehart and Abramson (1999, 673) cite Australia among a group of '28 high-income' countries that exhibit 'stronger relationships between values and age' than found in the United States. We dispute Inglehart and Abramson's findings in relation to Australia. We show that the relationship between age and values in Australia, like the United States, is very weak, highlight the problematic nature of assuming a linear relationship between age and values without evidence, and discover a new non-linear relationship between values and birth cohorts in Australia that has implications for the study of values research internationally.

Criticizing groups from the inside and the outside: An identity perspective on the intergroup sensitivity effect

Research on group criticism has demonstrated that criticisms are received less defensively when made by an ingroup member than when made by an outsider (the intergroup sensitivity effect). Three experiments tested the extent to which this effect is driven by social identity concerns or by judgments of how experienced the source of the criticism is. In Experiments I and 2, Australians who criticized Australia (ingroup critics) were met with less defensiveness than were foreigners who criticized Australia (outgroup critics), regardless of the amount of experience the foreigner had with Australia. Furthermore, the effects of speaker type on evaluations were mediated by perceptions of the extent to which the criticisms were intended to be constructive but not by perceptions of experience. Finally, Experiment 3 indicated that although experience does not help outgroup critics, a lack of experience can hurt ingroup critics. Recommendations are provided as to how people can reduce defensiveness when making group criticisms.

'You can criticize because you care': Identity attachment, constructiveness, and the intergroup sensitivity effect

Criticism of one's group (e.g. nation, gender, or organization) is typically received in a less defensive way when it stems from another ingroup member than when it stems from an outsider (the intergroup sensitivity effect). We present two experiments demonstrating that this effect is driven not by group membership per se, but by the extent to which critics are perceived to be psychologically invested in the group they are criticizing. In Experiment 1 (N = 117), Australian participants were exposed to criticisms of their country from either other Australians (ingroup critics) or non-Australians (outgroup critics). Furthermore, the ingroup critics were described as having either strong or weak attachment to their Australian identity. Ingroup critics were only received more positively than outgroup critics when they appeared to have a psychological investment in the group. In Experiment 2 (N = 96) we show how outgroup critics (Asian-Australians) can overcome defensiveness among Anglo-Australians by locating themselves within a shared, superordinate identity (Australian). Implications for communication within and between groups are discussed.

Group-directed criticism in Indonesia: Role of message source and audience

Research in individualist cultures has shown that group members are more likely to agree with criticisms of their group when the criticisms are made by another ingroup member as opposed to an outgroup member (the intergroup sensitivity effect). However, evaluations of ingroup critics are often harsher when they take their comments to an outgroup audience. In light of research on facework and tolerance for dissent, it seems important to test whether these effects are generalizable to a collectivist culture. Indonesian Muslims (N = 191) received a criticism of their religion stemming either from another Muslim or a Christian, and published in either a Muslim or a Christian newspaper. Participants agreed with the comments more when they were made by an ingroup as opposed to an outgroup member. Furthermore, consistent with previous research in Australia, the effects of audience on agreement were moderated by levels of group identification. Results are discussed in relation to theory about the functional role internal critics can play in group life.

Whither the responsibility to protect? Humanitarian intervention and the 2005 World Summit

At the 2005 World Summit, the world's leaders committed themselves to the "responsibility to protect", recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world's most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world's states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN's High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.

Signal or Noise? Information Theory and the Novel

In the context of a hostile funding environment, universities are increasingly asked to justify their output in narrowly defined economic terms, and this can be difficult in Humanities or Arts faculties where productivity is rarely reducible to a simple financial indicator. This can lead to a number of immediate consequences that I have no need to rehearse here, but can also result in some interesting tensions within the academic community itself. First is that which has become known as the ‘Science Wars’: the increasingly acrimonious exchanges between scientists and scientific academics and cultural critics or theorists about who has the right to describe the world. Much has already been said—and much remains to be said—about this issue, but it is not my intention to discuss it here. Rather, I will look at a second area of contestation: the incorporation of scientific theory into literary or cultural criticism. Much of this work comes from a genuine commitment to interdisciplinarity, and an appreciation of insights that a fresh perspective can bring to a familiar object. However, some can be seen as cynical attempts to lend literary studies the sort of empirical legitimacy of the sciences. In particular, I want to look at a number of critics who have applied information theory to the literary work. In this paper, I will examine several instances of this sort of criticism, and then, through an analysis of a novel by American author Richard Powers, Three Farmers on Their Way to a Dance, show how this sort of criticism merely reduces the meaningful analysis of a complex literary text.

Teaching economic philosophy: Economics, ethics and the search for the right maximand

Economic philosophy is not often taught, and is not necessarily easily taught. It involves enquiry into implicit assumptions within orthodox economics and within alternatives to it. It seeks to highlight why it is that some critics object that neoclassical economics is too atomistic, hedonistic, and rationalistic, or why others lament that there is much hidden metaphysics in Friedman and his Chicago School colleagues. It addresses the issue of whether - in a reversal of the view that economics is the imperialistic social science - significant philosophical assumptions have been silently but inescapably imported into orthodox economics. This paper seeks to facilitate the presentation of such material with illustrations selected from social economics, development economics, and critiques of utilitarianism.