The role of the church in developing the law: response to commentators

Three of the four commentators endorse our concerns about intervention by the Roman Catholic church as an omicus curiae in civil litigation, with few reservations. One commentary rejects our arguments in We deal first with the three commentaries that support our arguments; secondly, with the reservations and qualifications in those commentaries, and thirdly, with the commentary that totally rejects our arguments.

Elephants and polity in ancient India as exemplified by Kautilya's Arthasastra (Science of Polity)

After providing some background on the domestication and use of elephants in ancient India, this article concentrates on the role of the elephant in Indian statescraft as outlined in Kautilya’s Arthasastra, reputed to have been written in the fourth century BC (over 2300 years ago). The body of this essay is presented as follows: first background on the nature of Kautilya’s Arthasastra is provided and then his advice is outlined and discussed about the care of elephants. This care involves the duty of the King, the duties of the superintendent of elephants and the law relating to the treatment of elephants. Subsequently, Kautilya’s views about the use of elephants in war are considered. The essay concludes with an overall assessment of the role of the elephant in the polity of ancient India as portrayed by Kautilya. It is argued that the high use value of elephants to ancient Indian rulers, especially in war, had a significant positive impact on the conservation of Asian wild elephants, and incidentally other wildlife in India as well. Today, the conservation of the Asian elephant depends mostly on its use for tourism and its non-use economic values which reflect human empathy with it and which are reinforced in India by social and cultural values.

The role of the church in developing the law

The church and other community organisations have a legitimate role to play in influencing public policy. However, intervention by the church and other religious bodies in recent litigation in Australia and the United Kingdom raises questions about the appropriateness of such bodies being permitted to intervene directly in the court process as amici curiae. We argue that there are dangers in such bodies insinuating their doctrine under the guise of legal argument in civil proceedings, but find it difficult to enunciate a principled distinction between doctrine and legal argument. We advise that judges should exercise caution in dealing with amicus submissions.