6 resultados para Branch banking
em University of Queensland eSpace - Australia
Resumo:
Australian banks are currently generating huge profits but are they sustainable? NECMI AVKIRAN suggests that banks will need to scrutinise the performance of their networks to ensure future profits.
Resumo:
Why do governments offload major instruments such as monetary policy to an independent central bank? This article answers this question in relation to the Australian case, a case which reflects wider global developments. The article challenges the methodology of quantitative approaches to explaining central bank independence and instead argues that a model of 'embedded statism' is the most fruitful explanatory approach.
Resumo:
Service quality is assessed by customers along the dimensions of staff conduct, credibility, communication, and access to teller services. Credibility and staff conduct emerge as the highest loading first-order factors. This highlights the significance of rectifying mistakes while keeping customers informed, and employing branch staff that are responsive and civilized in their conduct. Discovery of a valid second-order factor, namely, overall customer service quality, underscores the importance of providing quality service across all its dimensions. For example, if the bank fails to rectify mistakes and keep customers informed but excels in all other dimensions, its overall customer service quality can still be rated poorly.
Resumo:
This paper tests the explanatory capacities of different versions of new institutionalism by examining the Australian case of a general transition in central banking practice and monetary politics: namely, the increased emphasis on low inflation and central bank independence. Standard versions of rational choice institutionalism largely dominate the literature on the politics of central banking, but this approach (here termed RC1) fails to account for Australian empirics. RC1 has a tendency to establish actor preferences exogenously to the analysis; actors' motives are also assumed a priori; actor's preferences are depicted in relatively static, ahistorical terms. And there is the tendency, even a methodological requirement, to assume relatively simple motives and preference sets among actors, in part because of the game theoretic nature of RC1 reasoning. It is possible to build a more accurate rational choice model by re-specifying and essentially updating the context, incentives and choice sets that have driven rational choice in this case. Enter RC2. However, this move subtly introduces methodological shifts and new theoretical challenges. By contrast, historical institutionalism uses an inductive methodology. Compared with deduction, it is arguably better able to deal with complexity and nuance. It also utilises a dynamic, historical approach, and specifies (dynamically) endogenous preference formation by interpretive actors. Historical institutionalism is also able to more easily incorporate a wider set of key explanatory variables and incorporate wider social aggregates. Hence, it is argued that historical institutionalism is the preferred explanatory theory and methodology in this case.