Secular trend in the development of fatness during childhood and adolescence

This study examined the development of fatness, as indexed by skinfold thickness, in healthy Caucasian children and adolescents residing in the same location in Canada in the 1960s and the 1990s. The data comes from two longitudinal studies, conducted approximately 30 years apart, of children aged 8-16 years. The first study (1964-1973) annually measured 207 males and 140 females. The second investigation (1991-1997) repeatedly measured 113 males and 115 females. Identical measurement tools and protocols were used for height, body mass, and skinfolds. Maturational age was estimated as a measure in years from age of peak height velocity. Males from the second investigation matured significantly (P < 0.05) earlier. Multilevel regression modeling was utilized to determine developmental curves for the individuals within the two populations. When differences in height, body mass, and maturity were controlled, skinfold thicknesses of the males and females in the second study were significantly greater (P < 0.05) than age- and sex-matched peers in the first study. This was not seen in models of the BMI. The results suggest that when maturity and size were controlled, the fatness of children and adolescents increased over 30 years. (C) 2002 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Conflicting obligations: Pufendorf, Leibniz and Barbeyrac on civil authority

Barbeyrac's republication of and commentary on Leibniz' attack on Pufendorf's natural-law doctrine is often seen as symptomatic of the failure of all three early moderns to solve a particular moral-philosophical problem: that of the relationship between civil authority and morality. Making use of the first English translation of Barbeyrac's work, this article departs from the usual view by arguing that here we are confronted by three conflicting constructions of civil obligation, arising not from the common intellectual terrain of moral philosophy, but from divergent religious and political cultures. If this approach makes the three constructions less susceptible to theoretical reconciliation, then it opens them to a more revealing historical investigation, in terms of the particular religious and political circumstances in which they arose, and which they were designed to address. The result is that these early modern struggles over the nature of civil obligation confront us again as unfinished historical business.

Judicial (in)activism in Australia's secular commonwealth

his article addresses two aspects of Australia's soft secular government. The first aspect explains how, and asks why, judges have been inactive in helping to draw the contours of secular government in Australia. The principal reason is that much of the social regulation that provokes the interest of faith-based groups is the constitutional concern of the States, and no State Constitution claims to coordinate relations between church and state. Moreover, the electorate has twice refused to pass referenda, in 1944 and 1988, for extending a constitutional demand of secular governance to the States. However, this is not so for the Commonwealth. It falls under the restrictions of section 116 of the federal Constitution, which states: The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion ('the establishment clause') or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion ('the free exercise clause'), and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth. As will be explained, while methods of legal interpretation suggest that section 116's establishment clause could place mild demands of non-discrimination on the federal Parliament, judicial inactivity in policing such demands on the Commonwealth, paradoxically, has arguably been secured by judicial activism in the High Court. A second aspect of secular government addressed is the High Court's disposal of 'the separation of church and state' as a constitutional principle in Australia. The contrast, of course, is to the United States, where for sixty years 'separation' has been given uneven recognition as a rule of constitutional law, and has undoubtedly driven the development of hard forms of secular governance in that country. The centrepiece of American secular government is the 1971 decision in Lemon v Kurtzman, where the US Supreme Court held that valid legislation had to pass three tests, ie: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion .. . finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion. The third 'entanglement' prong of Lemon is the modern, less ambitious, form of the 'wall of separation', prohibiting too close an engagement between church and state. As this paper will demonstrate, 'entanglement's' destiny shows how unlikely it is that 'separation' can survive as a meaningful constitutional principle in the USA. And, it will also be argued that 'separation' has even poorer prospects for import to Australia.

Desperately seeking donors: The 'saviour siblings' decision in quintaville v human fertilisation embryology authority (UK)

The recent House of Lords decision in Quintavalle v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has raised difficult and complex issues regarding the extent to which embryo selection and reproductive technology can be used as a means of rectifying genetic disorders and treating critically ill children. This comment outlines the facts of Quintavalle and explores how the House of Lords approached the legal, ethical and policy issues that arose out of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority's (UK) decision to allow reproductive and embryo technology to be used to produce a 'saviour sibling' whose tissue could be used to save the life of a critically ill child. Particular attention will be given to the implications of the decision in Quintavalle for Australian family and medical law and policy. As part of this focus, the comment explores the current Australian legislative and policy framework regarding the use of genetic and reproductive technology as a mechanism through which to assist critically ill siblings. It is argued that the present Australian framework would appear to impose significant limits on the medical uses of genetic technology and, in this context, would seem to reflect many of the principles that were articulated by the House of Lords in Quintavalle.

Charlatan philosopher and wise enchantress: Seduction and authority in eighteenth-century French discourses on happiness

In late 1757 Rousseau wrote a series of moral letters on happiness to Mme Sophie d'Houdetot. He distinguished himself and his teaching from the empty babble and hypocrisy prevalent in 'the century of philosophy and reason'. Philosophers were charlatans peddling happiness. This paper shows how Rousseau's critique of philosophy reworks the standard image of charlatans in the public square. It highlights a questioning and a gendering of reason implicit in the issue of credentials for teaching happiness. Against the dubious authority of the philosopher, Rousseau casts Sophie as the wise enchantress whose gentle influence inspires her tutor. He places moral authority outside the public square in a private, feminine domain. Rousseau's ideal woman cannot be a tainted charlatan like him. Yet the very opposition puts her in her place. (Author abstract)