Vicarious dissonance: Attitude change from the inconsistency of others

Three studies support the vicarious dissonance hypothesis that individuals change their attitudes when witnessing members of important groups engage in inconsistent behavior. Study 1, in which participants observed an actor in an induced-compliance paradigm, documented that students who identified with their college supported an issue more after hearing an ingroup member make a counterattitudinal speech in favor of that issue. In Study 2, vicarious dissonance occurred even when participants did not hear a speech, and attitude change was highest when the speaker was known to disagree with the issue. Study 3 showed that speaker choice and aversive consequences moderated vicarious dissonance, and demonstrated that vicarious discomfort-the discomfort observers imagine feeling if in an actor's place-was attenuated after participants expressed their revised attitudes.

Morningness-eveningness orientation, optimal time-of-day and attitude change: Evidence for the systematic processing of a persuasive communication

This study investigates the effects of morningness-eveningness orientation and time-of-day on persuasion. In an attitude change paradigm, 120 female participants read a persuasive message that consisted of six counter-attitudinal arguments (anti-voluntary euthanasia) either in the morning (8:30 a.m.) or in the evening (7:00 p.m.). Attitude change was assessed by measuring attitudes towards the target issue before and after exposure to the message. Message processing was assessed by thought-listing and message recall tasks. Self-reported mood and arousal were monitored throughout. Participants were classified into M- and E-types according to their scores on the Horne and Ostberg (1976) MEQ questionnaire. When tested at their respective optimal time-of-day (i.e., morning for M-types/evening for E-types), M- and E-types reported higher energetic arousal, greater agreement with the message, greater message-congruent thinking, and a propensity for superior message recall compared to M- and E-types tested at their nonoptimal time-of-day (i.e., evening for M-types/morning for E-types). The attitude change in those tested at their optimal time-of-day was mediated by the level of message-congruent thinking. Results are interpreted in terms of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Attitude change and the public-private attitude distinction

In this paper, we highlight the importance of the distinction between public and private attitudes in research on attitude change. First, we clarify the definitions of public and private attitudes by locating the researcher as a potential source of influence. In a test of this definition, we compare participant reports of potentially embarrassing behaviour and the study's importance between participants responding when a researcher has potential access to their reports (public condition), and participants whose reports the researcher has no potential access to (private condition). Participants high in public self-focus or low in defensive self-presentation reported the study to be more important in the public condition than the private condition. Further, participants in the public condition reported less frequency of engaging in embarrassing behaviours than those in the private condition, an effect not moderated by individual differences. We conclude that the public-private distinction is an essential element in attitude change theory.

Attitude-behaviour consistency: the role of group norms, attitude accessibility, and mode of behavioural decision-making

The interplay between two perspectives that have recently been applied in the attitude area-the social identity approach to attitude-behaviour relations (Terry & Hogg, 1996) and the MODE model (Fazio, 1990a)-was examined in the present research. Two experimental studies were conducted to examine the role of group norms, group identification, attitude accessibility, and mode of behavioural decision-making in the attitude-behaviour relationship. In Study I (N = 211), the effects of norms and identification on attitude-behaviour consistency as a function of attitude accessibility and mood were investigated. Study 2 (N = 354) replicated and extended the first experiment by using time pressure to manipulate mode of behavioural decision-making. As expected, the effects of norm congruency varied as a function of identification and mode of behavioural decision-making. Under conditions assumed to promote deliberative processing (neutral mood/low time pressure), high identifiers behaved in a manner consistent with the norm. No effects emerged under positive mood and high time pressure conditions. In Study 2, there was evidence that exposure to an attitude-incongruent norm resulted in attitude change only under low accessibility conditions. The results of these studies highlight the powerful role of group norms in directing individual behaviour and suggest limited support for the MODE model in this context. Copyright (C) 2003 John Wiley Sons, Ltd.

Reacting to an assumed situation vs. conforming to an assumed reaction: The role of perceived speaker attitude in vicarious dissonance

Witnessing an ingroup member acting against his or her belief can lead individuals who identify with that group to change their own attitude in the direction of that counterattitudinal behavior. Two studies demonstrate this vicarious dissonance effect among high ingroup identifiers and show that this attitude change is not attributable to conformity to a perceived change in speaker attitude. Study I shows that the effect occurs-indeed, is stronger-even when it is clear that the speaker disagrees with the position espoused, and Study 2 shows that foreseeable aversive consequences bring about attitude change in the observer without any parallel impact on the perceived attitude of the speaker. Furthermore, the assumption that vicarious dissonance is at heart a group phenomenon is supported by the results indicating that attitude change is not impacted either by individual differences in dispositional empathy or measures of interpersonal affinity.

Levels of consensus and majority and minority influence

Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of consensus information on majority and minority influence. In all experiments two levels of consensus difference were examined; large (82% versus 18%) and small (52% versus 48%). Experiment 1 showed that a majority source had more influence than a minority source, irrespective of consensus level. Experiment 2 examined the cause of this effect by presenting only the source label ('majority' versus 'minority'), only the consensus information (percentages) or both. The superior influence of the majority was again found when either (a) both source label and consensus information were given (replicating Experiment 1) and (b) only consensus information was given, but not when (c) only the source label was given. The results showed majority influence was due to the consensus information indicating more than 50% of the population supported that position. Experiment 3 also manipulated message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to identify whether systematic processing had occurred. Message quality only had an impact with the minority of 18%. These studies show that consensus information has different effects' for majority and minority influence. For majority influence, having over 50% support is sufficient to cause compliance while for a minority there are advantages to being numerically small, in terms of leading to detailed processing of its message. Copyright (C) 2002 John Wiley Sons, Ltd.

Majority versus minority influence: When, not whether, source status instigates heuristic or systematic processing

Two experiments investigated the extent of message processing of a persuasive communication proposed by either a numerical majority or minority. Both experiments crossed source status (majority versus minority) with message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to determine which source condition is associated with systematic processing. The first experiment showed a reliable difference between strong and weak messages, indicating systematic processing had occurred, for a minority irrespective of message direction (pro- versus counter-attitudinal), but not for a majority. The second experiment showed that message outcome moderates when a majority or a minority leads to systematic processing. When the message argued for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the majority source; but when the message did not argue for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the minority source. Thus one key moderator of whether a majority or minority source leads to message processing is whether the topic induces defensive processing motivated by self-interest. Copyright (C) 2002 John Wiley Sons, Ltd.

Resistance to persuasive messages as a function of majority and minority source status

Three experiments examined the extent to which attitudes following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter-persuasion. In Experiment 1, participants' attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages which argued opposite positions (initial pro-attitudinal message and subsequent, counter-attitudinal counter-message). Attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a (second) counter-message than attitudes following majority endorsement of the initial message. Experiment 2 replicated this finding when the message direction was reversed (counter-attitudinal initial message and pro-attitudinal counter-message) and showed that the level of message elaboration mediated the amount of attitude resistance. Experiment 3 included conditions where participants received only the counter-message and showed that minority-source participants had resisted the second message (counter-message) rather than being influenced by it. These results show that minority influence induces systematic processing of its arguments which leads to attitudes which are resistant to counter-persuasion. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

I'm a hypocrite, but so is everyone else: Group support and the reduction of cognitive dissonance

The impact of social support on dissonance arousal was investigated from a social identity view of dissonance theory. This perspective is seen as augmenting current conceptualizations of dissonance theory by predicting when normative information will impact on dissonance arousal and by indicating the availability of identity-related strategies of dissonance reduction. An experiment was conducted to induce feelings of hypocrisy under conditions of behavioral support or nonsupport. Group salience was either high or low, or individual identity was emphasized. As predicted, participants with no support from the salient in-group exhibited the greatest need to reduce dissonance through attitude change and reduced levels of group identification. Results were interpreted in terms of self being central to the arousal and reduction of dissonance.

Expanding the scope of the social response context model

Descriptive models of social response are concerned with identifying and discriminating between different types of response to social influence. In a previous article (Nail, MacDonald, & Levy, 2000), the authors demonstrated that 4 conceptual dimensions are necessary to adequately distinguish between such phenomena as conformity, compliance, contagion, independence, and anticonformity in a single model. This article expands the scope of the authors' 4-dimensional approach by reviewing selected experimental and cultural evidence, further demonstrating the integrative power of the model. This review incorporates political psychology, culture and aggression, self-persuasion, group norms, prejudice, impression management, psychotherapy, pluralistic ignorance, bystander intervention/nonintervention, public policy, close relationships, and implicit attitudes.

Caffeine, cognition, and persuasion: Evidence for caffeine increasing the systematic processing of persuasive messages

Caffeine is known to increase arousal, attention, and information processing-all factors implicated in facilitating persuasion. In a standard attitude-change paradigm, participants consumed an orange-juice drink that either contained caffeine (3.5 mg/kg body weight) or did not (placebo) prior to reading a counterattitudinal communication (anti-voluntary euthanasia). Participants then completed a thought-listing task and a number of attitude scales. The first experiment showed that those who consumed caffeine showed greater agreement with the communication (direct attitude: voluntary euthanasia) and on an issue related to, but not contained in, the communication (indirect attitude: abortion). The order in which direct and indirect attitudes were measured did not affect the results. A second experiment manipulated the quality of the arguments in the message (strong vs. weak) to determine whether systematic processing had occurred. There was evidence that systematic processing occurred in both drink conditions, but was greater for those who had consumed caffeine. In both experiments, the amount of message-congruent thinking mediated persuasion. These results show that caffeine can increase the extent to which people systematically process and are influenced by a persuasive communication.

Group consensus in social influence: Type of consensus information as a moderator of majority and minority influence

Three experiments investigated the effect of consensus information on majority and minority influence. Experiment 1 examined the effect of consensus expressed by descriptive adjectives (large vs. small) on social influence. A large source resulted in more influence than a small source, irrespective of source status (majority vs. minority). Experiment 2 showed that large sources affected attitudes heuristically, whereas only a small minority instigated systematic processing of the message. Experiment 3 manipulated the type of consensus information, either in terms of descriptive adjectives (large, small) or percentages (82%, 18%, 52%, 48%). When, consensus was expressed in terms of descriptive adjectives, the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 were replicated (large, sources were more influential than small sources), but when. consensus was expressed, in terms of percentages, the majority was more influential than the minority, irrespective of group consensus.

Enlisting the influence of others: Alternative strategies for persuasive media campaigns

This study investigated an Australian antidrug campaign that targeted adolescents directly and indirectly via recruiting parents into drug prevention. Eighty-six parent-child dyads completed surveys measuring campaign evaluations, discussions about drugs, and beliefs about risks to self (own child) and to the average young Australian. Adolescents were optimistic about risks, and media impact was evident only in perceptions of risk to others. Parents were less optimistic, and perceptions of campaign quality predicted perceived risk to own child and discussion about drugs. However, this was moderated by negative affect associated with the campaign. There was some evidence that discussions influenced adolescents' perceptions of personal risk. This demonstrates the importance of individual responses and communication processes in determining the impact of persuasive media messages.

The effects of caffeine consumption on direct and indirect majority and minority influence

A study is reported that examines the effect of caffeine consumption on majority and minority influence. In a double blind procedure, 72 participants consumed an orange drink, which either contained caffeine (3.5mg per kilogram of body weight) or did not (placebo). After a 40-minute delay, participants read a counter-attitudinal message (antivoluntary euthanasia) endorsed by either a numerical majority or minority. Both direct (message issue, i.e., voluntary euthanasia) and indirect (message issue-related, i.e., abortion) change was assessed by attitude scales completed before and after exposure to the message. In the placebo condition, the findings replicated the predictions of Moscovici's (1980) conversion theory; namely, majorities leading to compliance (direct influence) and minorities leading to conversion (indirect influence). When participants had consumed caffeine, majorities not only led to more direct influence than in the placebo condition but also to indirect influence. Minorities, by contrast, had no impact on either level of influence. The results suggest that moderate levels of caffeine increase systematic processing of the message but the consequences of this vary for each source. When the source is a majority there was increased indirect influence while for a minority there was decreased indirect influence. The results show the need to understand how contextual factors can affect social influence processes.

When group members admit to being conformist: The role of relative intragroup status in conformity self-reports

Five studies examined the hypothesis that people will strategically portray the self as being more g-roup influenced the more junior they feel within the group. Among social psychologists (Study 1), ratings of self-conformity by g-roup members were greater when the status of the participant was low than when it was high. These effects were replicated in Studies 2, 3, and 4 in which relative intragroup status was manipulated. In Study 3, the authors found junior group members described themselves as more conformist than senior members when they were addressing an ingroup audience, but when they were addressing an outgroup audience the effect disappeared. Furthermore, junior members (but not senior members) rated themselves as more conformist when they were led to believe their responses were public than when responses were private (Study 5). The discussion focuses on the strategic processes underlying low-status group members' self-reports of group influence and the functional role of conformity in groups.