Long-run effects of unfunded social security with earnings-dependent benefits

This paper examines the effects of unfunded social security with bequests, fertility and human capital by considering a mix of earnings-dependent and universal social security benefits. We show that social security is more likely to promote growth by reducing fertility and increasing human capital investment if its benefits are more dependent on individuals' own earnings. Through simulations, we find that the differences in the effects of social security resulting from variations in the benefit formula can be too substantial to be ignored. We also investigate the welfare effect in calibrated economies. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Cleaner fish use tactile dancing behavior as a preconflict management strategy

The most commonly asked question about cooperative interactions is how they are maintained when cheating is theoretically more profitable [1]. In cleaning interactions, where cleaners remove parasites from apparently cooperating clients, the classical question asked is why cleaner fish can clean piscivorous client fish without being eaten, a problem Trivers [2] used to explain reciprocal altruism. Trivers [2] suggested that predators refrain from eating cleaners only when the repeated removal of parasites by a particular cleaner results in a greater benefit than eating the cleaner. Although several theoretical models have examined cheating behavior in clients [3,4], no empirical tests have been done (but see Darcy [5]). It has been observed that cleaners are susceptible to predation [6, 7]. Thus, cleaners should have evolved strategies to avoid conflict or being eaten. In primates, conflicts are often resolved with conflict or preconflict management behavior [8]. Here, I show that cleaner fish tactically stimulate clients while swimming in an oscillating dancing manner (tactile dancing) more when exposed to hungry piscivorous clients than satiated ones, regardless of the client's parasite load. Tactile dancing thus may function as a preconflict management strategy that enables cleaner fish to avoid conflict with potentially dangerous clients.

Image scoring and cooperation in a cleaner fish mutualism

Humans are highly social animals and often help unrelated individuals that may never reciprocate the altruist's favour(1-5). This apparent evolutionary puzzle may be explained by the altruist's gain in social image: image-scoring bystanders, also known as eavesdroppers, notice the altruistic act and therefore are more likely to help the altruist in the future(5-7). Such complex indirect reciprocity based on altruistic acts may evolve only after simple indirect reciprocity has been established, which requires two steps. First, image scoring evolves when bystanders gain personal benefits from information gathered, for example, by finding cooperative partners(8-10). Second, altruistic behaviour in the presence of such bystanders may evolve if altruists benefit from access to the bystanders. Here, we provide experimental evidence for both of the requirements in a cleaning mutualism involving the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus. These cleaners may cooperate and remove ectoparasites from clients or they may cheat by feeding on client mucus(11,12). As mucus may be preferred over typical client ectoparasites(13), clients must make cleaners feed against their preference to obtain a cooperative service. We found that eavesdropping clients spent more time next to 'cooperative' than 'unknown cooperative level' cleaners, which shows that clients engage in image-scoring behaviour. Furthermore, trained cleaners learned to feed more cooperatively when in an `image-scoring' than in a 'non-image-scoring' situation.