Pattern-based reuse of successful designs: usability ofsafety-critical systems

Users of safety-critical systems are expected to effectively control or monitor complex systems, with errors potentially leading to catastrophe. For such systems, safety is of paramount importance and must be designed into the human-machine interface. While many case studies show how inadequate design practice led to poor safety and usability, concrete guidance on good design practices is scarce. The paper argues that the pattern language paradigm, widely used in the software design community, is a suitable means of documenting appropriate design strategies. We discuss how typical usability-related properties (e.g., flexibility) need some adjustment to be used for assessing safety-critical systems, and document a pattern language, based on corresponding "safety-usability" principles

An automated failure mode and effect analysis based on high-level design specificication with behavior trees

Formal methods have significant benefits for developing safety critical systems, in that they allow for correctness proofs, model checking safety and liveness properties, deadlock checking, etc. However, formal methods do not scale very well and demand specialist skills, when developing real-world systems. For these reasons, development and analysis of large-scale safety critical systems will require effective integration of formal and informal methods. In this paper, we use such an integrative approach to automate Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), a widely used system safety analysis technique, using a high-level graphical modelling notation (Behavior Trees) and model checking. We inject component failure modes into the Behavior Trees and translate the resulting Behavior Trees to SAL code. This enables us to model check if the system in the presence of these faults satisfies its safety properties, specified by temporal logic formulas. The benefit of this process is tool support that automates the tedious and error-prone aspects of FMEA.