An Economic Analysis of the Legal Concept of Trustees' Power of Investment

Authorised trustee status is a legal concept which has economic implications; one of the major implications is that it assists in the direction of investment funds into particular securities and areas of the economy. The concept of authorised trustee status, while attempting to achieve specific outcomes for the beneficiaries of trusts cannot be relied upon to secure these results. Economic analysis of the role of the trustee maintains that this role is one of portfolio manager; a role which is complex but which is explicable in terms of definable procedures and practices. The role of trustee as portfolio manager is one which requires greater financial knowledge than can be assumed is possessed by all trustees. The trustee as portfolio manager is required to maintain a review of decisions make under powers to invest trust assets. A solution to the problem of authorised trustee status is proposed. The solution takes two parts: the first is the adoption of the prudent person approach but with the codification of duties of the trustee and the explicit listing of the factors that a trustee should consider in using the investment powers. The second part of the proposed solution is to link the investment powers of trustees to the best practice features of securities advisers who are now licensed by a regulatory body, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission.

Rehabilitating the common intention trust

Position of the common intention principle in Australia - the principle should continue to exist - evidentiary difficulties means that the principle is infrequently invoked - claimants who cannot produce sufficient evidence of a common intention may be entitled to relief via equitable estoppel or the joint endeavour principle - the doctrinal foundation of the common intention trust - alternative rationales for the common intention trust.

Bimanual aiming and overt attention: one law for two hands

Reaching to interact with an object requires a compromise between the speed of the limb movement and the required end-point accuracy. The time it takes one hand to move to a target in a simple aiming task can be predicted reliably from Fitts' law, which states that movement time is a function of a combined measure of amplitude and accuracy constraints (the index of difficulty, ID). It has been assumed previously that Fitts' law is violated in bimanual aiming movements to targets of unequal ID. We present data from two experiments to show that this assumption is incorrect: if the attention demands of a bimanual aiming task are constant then the movements are well described by a Fitts' law relationship. Movement time therefore depends not only on ID but on other task conditions, which is a basic feature of Fitts' law. In a third experiment we show that eye movements are an important determinant of the attention demands in a bimanual aiming task. The results from the third experiment extend the findings of the first two experiments and show that bimanual aiming often relies on the strategic co-ordination of separate actions into a seamless behaviour. A number of the task specific strategies employed by the adult human nervous system were elucidated in the third experiment. The general strategic pattern observed in the hand trajectories was reflected by the pattern of eye movements recorded during the experiment. The results from all three experiments demonstrate that eye movements must be considered as an important constraint in bimanual aiming tasks.

Popper and his Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: a close shave for the Law of Gravitation?

Knowledge of residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus in the early 1840s did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation but instead to the discovery of Neptune in 1846. Karl Popper asserts that this case is atypical of science and that the law of gravitation was at least prima facie falsified by these perturbations. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position I call, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF). Further, on the evidence the law was not prima facie false and was not generally considered so by astronomers at the time. Many of Popper's commentators (Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and others) presuppose WPF and their views on this case and its implications for scientific rationality and method suffer from this same defect.