The Hierarchical Structure of the Firm: A Geometric Perspective

This paper incorporates hierarchical structure into the neoclassical theory of the firm. Firms are hierarchical in two respects: the organization of workers in production and the wage structure. The firm’s hierarchy is represented as the sector of a circle, where the radius represents the hierarchy’s height, the width of the sector represents the breadth of the hierarchy at a given height, and the angle of the sector represents span of control for any given supervisor. A perfectly competitive firm then chooses height and width, as well as capital inputs, in order to maximize profit. We analyze the short run and long run impact of changes in scale economies, input substitutability and input and output prices on the firm’s hierarchical structure. We find that the firm unambiguously becomes more hierarchical as the specialization of its workers increases or as its output price increases relative to input prices. The effect of changes in scale economies is contingent on the output price. The model also brings forth an analysis of wage inequality within the firm, which is found to be independent of technological considerations, and only depends on the firm’s wage schedule.

Local Utility Functions and Local Probability Transformations

This note shows that, under appropriate conditions, preferences may be locally approximated by the linear utility or risk-neutral preference functional associated with a local probability transformation.

Jointly radial and translation homothetic preferences: generalized constant risk aversion

The paper identifies the structural restrictions on preferences required for them to exhibit both translation homotheticity in particular direction and radial homotheticity. The results are illustrated by an application to an asset allocation problem in the absence of riskless asset.

Invariant risk attitudes

Concepts of constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion have proved useful in the analysis of choice under uncertainty, but are quite restrictive, particularly when they are imposed jointly. A generalization of constant risk aversion, referred to as invariant risk aversion is developed. Invariant risk aversion is closely related to the possibility of representing preferences over state-contingent income vectors in terms of two parameters, the mean and a linearly homogeneous, translation-invariant index of riskiness. The best-known index with such properties is the standard deviation. The properties of the capital asset pricing model, usually expressed in terms of the mean and standard deviation, may be extended to the case of general invariant preferences. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Economics and psychology in the twenty-first century

This paper begins by exploring four different possible forms of relationship between economics and psychology, which have different connotations in terms of the relative status of the two disciplines. It then focuses on the future for one of these, psychological economics. After setting out the hardcore axioms and positive and negative heuristics of a research programme in psychological economics, it explores institutional and psychological barriers to the success of such a research programme in the context of both research and teaching.

Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard and flexible technology

(Magill, M., Quinzii, M., 2002. Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard. Journal of Mathematical Economics 38, 149-190) showed that, in a stockmarket economy with private information, the moral hazard problem may be resolved provided that a spanning overlap condition is satisfed. This result depends on the assumption that the technology is given by a stochastic production function with a single scalar input. The object of the present paper is to extend the analysis of Magill and Quinzii to the case of multiple inputs. We show that their main result extends to this general case if and only if, for each firm, the number of linearly independent combinations of securities having payoffs correlated with, but not dependent on, the firms output is equal to the number of degrees of freedom in the firm's production technology.