The gambling related cognitions scale (GRCS): development, confirmatory factor validation and psychometric properties

Aims The aims of this study are to develop and validate a measure to screen for a range of gambling-related cognitions (GRC) in gamblers. Design and participants A total of 968 volunteers were recruited from a community-based population. They were divided randomly into two groups. Principal axis factoring with varimax rotation was performed on group one and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used on group two to confirm the best-fitted solution. Measurements The Gambling Related Cognition Scale (GRCS) was developed for this study and the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS), the Motivation Towards Gambling Scale (MTGS) and the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-2 1) were used for validation. Findings Exploratory factor analysis performed using half the sample indicated five factors, which included interpretative control/bias (GRCS-IB), illusion of control (GRCS-IC), predictive control (GRCS-PC), gambling-related expectancies (GRCS-GE) and a perceived inability to stop gambling (GRCS-IS). These accounted for 70% of the total variance. Using the other half of the sample, CFA confirmed that the five-factor solution fitted the data most effectively. Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the factors ranged from 0.77 to 0.91, and 0.93 for the overall scale. Conclusions This paper demonstrated that the 23-item GRCS has good psychometric properties and thus is a useful instrument for identifying GRC among non-clinical gamblers. It provides the first step towards devising/adapting similar tools for problem gamblers as well as developing more specialized instruments to assess particular domains of GRC.

Familial influence on offspring gambling: a cognitive mechanism for transmission of gambling behavior in families

Background. The problem-gambling literature has identified a range of individual, cognitive, behavioral and emotional factors as playing important roles in the development, maintenance and treatment of problem gambling. However, familial factors have often been neglected. The current study aims to investigate the possible influence of parental factors on offspring gambling behavior. Method. A total of 189 families (546 individuals) completed several questionnaires including the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) and the Gambling Related Cognition Scale (GRCS). The relationships were examined using Pearson product-moment correlations and structural equation modeling (SEM) analyses. Results. Results showed that generally parents' (especially fathers') gambling cognitions and gambling behaviors positively correlated with offspring gambling behaviors and cognitions. However, SEM analyses showed that although parental gambling behavior was directly related to offspring gambling behavior, parental cognitions were not related to offspring gambling behavior directly but indirectly via offspring cognitions. Conclusion. The findings show that the influence of parental gambling cognition on offspring gambling behavior is indirect and via offspring cognitions. The results suggest a possible cognitive mechanism of transmission of gambling behavior in the family from one generation to the next.

The gambling urge scale: Development, confirmatory factor validation, and psychometric properties

The urge to gamble is a physiological, psychological, or emotional motivational state, often associated with continued gambling. The authors developed and validated the 6-item Gambling Urge Questionnaire (GUS), which was based on the 8-item Alcohol Urge Questionnaire (M. J. Bohn, D. D. Krahn, & B. A. Staehler, 1995), using 968 community-based participants. Exploratory factor analysis using half of the sample indicated a 1-factor solution that accounted for 55.18% of the total variance. This was confirmed using confirmatory factor analysis with the other half of the sample. The GUS had a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .81. Concurrent, predictive, and criterion-related validity of the GUS were good, suggesting that the GUS is a valid and reliable instrument for assessing gambling urges among nonclinical gamblers.

Cognitive fit between conceptual schemas and internal problem representations: The case of geospatio-temporal conceptual schema comprehension

Geospatio-temporal conceptual models provide a mechanism to explicitly represent geospatial and temporal aspects of applications. Such models, which focus on both what and when/where, need to be more expressive than conventional conceptual models (e.g., the ER model), which primarily focus on what is important for a given application. In this study, we view conceptual schema comprehension of geospatio-temporal data semantics in terms of matching the external problem representation (that is, the conceptual schema) to the problem-solving task (that is, syntactic and semantic comprehension tasks), an argument based on the theory of cognitive fit. Our theory suggests that an external problem representation that matches the problem solver's internal task representation will enhance performance, for example, in comprehending such schemas. To assess performance on geospatio-temporal schema comprehension tasks, we conducted a laboratory experiment using two semantically identical conceptual schemas, one of which mapped closely to the internal task representation while the other did not. As expected, we found that the geospatio-temporal conceptual schema that corresponded to the internal representation of the task enhanced the accuracy of schema comprehension; comprehension time was equivalent for both. Cognitive fit between the internal representation of the task and conceptual schemas with geospatio-temporal annotations was, therefore, manifested in accuracy of schema comprehension and not in time for problem solution. Our findings suggest that the annotated schemas facilitate understanding of data semantics represented on the schema.

Mind and body: Concepts of human cognition, physiology and false belief in children with autism or typical development

This study examined theory of mind (ToM) and concepts of human biology (eyes, heart, brain, lungs and mind) in a sample of 67 children, including 25 high functioning children with autism (age 6-13), plus age-matched and preschool comparison groups. Contrary to Baron-Cohen [1989, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19(4), 579-600], most children with autism correctly understood the functions of the brain (84%) and the mind (64%). Their explanations were predominantly mentalistic. They outperformed typically developing preschoolers in understanding inner physiological (heart, lungs) and cognitive (brain, mind) systems, and scored as high as age-matched typical children. Yet, in line with much previous ToM research, most children with autism (60%) failed false belief, and their ToM performance was unrelated to their understanding of. human biology. Results were discussed in relation to neurobiological and social-experiential accounts of the ToM deficit in autism.

Steps in theory-of-mind development for children with deafness or autism

Prior research demonstrates that understanding theory of mind (ToM) is seriously and similarly delayed in late-signing deaf children and children with autism. Are these children simply delayed in timing relative to typical children, or do they demonstrate different patterns of development? The current research addressed this question by testing 145 children (ranging from 3 to 13 years) with deafness, autism, or typical development using a ToM scale. Results indicate that all groups followed the same sequence of steps, up to a point, but that children with autism showed an importantly different sequence of understandings (in the later steps of the progression) relative to all other groups.

Understanding the multidimensionality of group development

This article presents a three-dimensional definition space of the group development literature that differentiates group development models on three dimensions: content, population, and path dependency. The multidimensional conceptualization structures and integrates the vast group development literature, enabling direct comparison of competing theories. The utility of this definition space is demonstrated by using the relative positioning of two seemingly competing group development models-the punctuated equilibrium model and the integrative model-to demonstrate their complementarity. The authors also show how organizational researchers and practitioners can use the three-dimensional definition space to select an appropriate theoretical model for the group or group process with which they are working.