An Economic Analysis of the Legal Concept of Trustees' Power of Investment

Authorised trustee status is a legal concept which has economic implications; one of the major implications is that it assists in the direction of investment funds into particular securities and areas of the economy. The concept of authorised trustee status, while attempting to achieve specific outcomes for the beneficiaries of trusts cannot be relied upon to secure these results. Economic analysis of the role of the trustee maintains that this role is one of portfolio manager; a role which is complex but which is explicable in terms of definable procedures and practices. The role of trustee as portfolio manager is one which requires greater financial knowledge than can be assumed is possessed by all trustees. The trustee as portfolio manager is required to maintain a review of decisions make under powers to invest trust assets. A solution to the problem of authorised trustee status is proposed. The solution takes two parts: the first is the adoption of the prudent person approach but with the codification of duties of the trustee and the explicit listing of the factors that a trustee should consider in using the investment powers. The second part of the proposed solution is to link the investment powers of trustees to the best practice features of securities advisers who are now licensed by a regulatory body, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission.

Testing for Market Power in Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output Industries: The Australian Grains and Oilseeds Industries

Recent empirical studies have found significant evidence of departures from competition in the input side of the Australian bread, breakfast cereal and margarine end-product markets. For example, Griffith (2000) found that firms in some parts of the processing and marketing sector exerted market power when purchasing grains and oilseeds from farmers. As noted at the time, this result accorded well with the views of previous regulatory authorities (p.358). In the mid-1990s, the Prices Surveillence Authority (PSA 1994) determined that the markets for products contained in the Breakfast Cereals and Cooking Oils and Fats indexes were "not effectively competitive" (p.14). The PSA consequently maintained price surveillence on the major firms in this product group. The Griffith result is also consistent with the large number of legal judgements against firms in this sector over the past decade for price fixing or other types of non-competitive behaviour. For example, bread manufacturer George Weston was fined twice during 2000 for non-competitive conduct and the ACCC has also recently pursued and won cases against retailer Safeway in grains and oilseeds product lines.