A cognitive model of binge drinking: The influence of alcohol expectancies and drinking refusal self-efficacy

While binge drinking-episodic or irregular consumption of excessive amounts of alcohol-is recognised as a serious problem affecting our youth, to date there has been a lack of psychological theory and thus theoretically driven research into this problem. The current paper develops a cognitive model using the key constructs of alcohol expectancies (AEs) and drinking refusal self-efficacy (DRSE) to explain the acquisition and maintenance of binge drinking. It is suggested that the four combinations of the AE and DRSE can explain the four drinking styles. These are normal/social drinkers, binge drinkers, regular heavy drinkers, and problem drinkers or alcoholics. Since AE and DRSE are cognitive constructs and therefore modifiable, the cognitive model can thus facilitate the design of intervention and-prevention strategies for binge drinking. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Normative influence and rational conflict decisions: Group norms and cost-benefit analyses for intergroup behavior

The present paper articulates a model in which ingroup and outgroup norms inform 'rational' decision-making (cost-benefit analysis) for conflict behaviors. Norms influence perceptions of the consequences of the behavior, and individuals may thus strategically conform to or violate norms in order to acquire benefits and avoid costs. Two studies demonstrate these processes in the context of conflict in Quebec. In the first study, Anglophones' perceptions of Francophone and Anglophone norms for pro-English behaviors predicted evaluations of the benefits and costs of the behaviors, and these cost-benefit evaluations in turn mediated the norm-intention links for both group norms. In the second study, a manipulated focus on supportive versus hostile ingroup and outgroup norms also predicted cost-benefit evaluations, which mediated the norm-intention relationships. The studies support a model of strategic conflict choices in which group norms inform, rather than suppress, rational expectancy value processes. Implications for theories of decision-making and normative influence are discussed.

Bad apples in bad barrels revisited: Cognitive moral development, just world beliefs, rewards, and ethical decision-making

In this study, we test the interactive effect on ethical decision-making of (1) personal characteristics, and (2) personal expectancies based on perceptions of organizational rewards and punishments. Personal characteristics studied were cognitive moral development and belief in a just world. Using an in-basket simulation, we found that exposure to reward system information influenced managers' outcome expectancies. Further, outcome expectancies and belief in a just world interacted with managers' cognitive moral development to influence managers' ethical decision-making. In particular, low-cognitive moral development managers who expected that their organization condoned unethical behavior made less ethical decisions while high cognitive moral development managers became more ethical in this environment. Low cognitive moral development managers also behaved less ethically when their belief in a just world was high.

With friends like these... The role of prejudice and situational norms on discriminatory helping behavior

An experiment was conducted to examine the impact of homophobic attitudes and situational norms for helping on discriminatory behavior against a gay male. In a partial replication of Frey and Gaertner (1986), participants were asked to provide help to a confederate portrayed to be either gay or heterosexual who either requested help for himself (ambiguous situational norm) or for whom a third party requested help (unambiguous situational norm). Participants' levels of homophobia were assessed either before or after the main helping task. The results indicated that when norms for helping were ambiguous those participants higher in homophobia discriminated against the gay male, but only on subtle indicators of discrimination. In the unambiguous norm condition, participants higher in homophobia discriminated against the heterosexual male. Those lower in homophobia did not discriminate under either norm condition. The results show that it may be sufficient for those with prejudiced attitudes just to believe that it is not the wrong thing to do for their attitudes to be translated into some form of discriminatory behavior.

Two times three little pigs: Dysfluency, cognitive complexity and autism

This paper presents an analysis of dysfluencies in two oral tellings of a familiar children's story by a young boy with autism. Thurber & Tager-Flusberg (1993) postulate a lower degree of cognitive and communicative investment to explain a lower frequency of non-grammatical pauses observed in elicited narratives of children with autism in comparison to typically developing and intellectually disabled controls. we also found a very low frequency of non-grammatical pauses in our data, but indications of high engagement and cognitive and communicative investment. We point to a wider range of disfluencies as indicators of cognitive load, and show that the kind and location of dysfluencies produced may reveal which aspects of the narrative task are creating the greatest cognitive demand: here, mental state ascription, perspectivization, and adherence to story schema. This paper thus generates analytical options and hypotheses that can be explored further in a larger population of children with autism and typically developing controls.

Hitting a moving target: Perception and action in the timing of rapid interceptions

Different interceptive tasks and modes of interception (hitting or capturing) do not necessarily involve similar control processes. Control based on preprogramming of movement parameters is possible for actions with brief movement times but is now widely rejected; continuous perceptuomotor control models are preferred for all types of interception. The rejection of preprogrammed control and acceptance of continuous control is evaluated for the timing of rapidly executed, manual hitting actions. It is shown that a preprogrammed control model is capable of providing a convincing account of observed behavior patterns that avoids many of the arguments that have been raised against it. Prominent continuous perceptual control models are analyzed within a common framework and are shown to be interpretable as feedback control strategies. Although these models can explain observations of on-line adjustments to movement, they offer only post hoc explanations for observed behavior patterns in hitting tasks and are not directly supported by data. It is proposed that rapid manual hitting tasks make up a class of interceptions for which a preprogrammed strategy is adopted-a strategy that minimizes the role of visual feedback. Such a strategy is effective when the task demands a high degree of temporal accuracy.

Interaction between Normative Systems and Cognitive Agents in Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic

While some recent frameworks on cognitive agents addressed the combination of mental attitudes with deontic concepts, they commonly ignore the representation of time. An exception is [1]that manages also some temporal aspects both with respect to cognition and normative provisions. We propose in this paper an extension of the logic presented in [1]with temporal intervals.

Rumors of the death of emotional intelligence in organizational behavior are vastly exaggerated

In the first of two articles presenting the case for emotional intelligence in a point/counterpoint exchange, we present a brief summary of research in the field, and rebut arguments against the construct presented in this issue.We identify three streams of research: (1) a four-branch abilities test based on the model of emotional intelligence defined in Mayer and Salovey (1997); (2) self-report instruments based on the Mayer–Salovey model; and (3) commercially available tests that go beyond the Mayer–Salovey definition. In response to the criticisms of the construct, we argue that the protagonists have not distinguished adequately between the streams, and have inappropriately characterized emotional intelligence as a variant of social intelligence. More significantly, two of the critical authors assert incorrectly that emotional intelligence research is driven by a utopian political agenda, rather than scientific interest. We argue, on the contrary, that emotional intelligence research is grounded in recent scientific advances in the study of emotion; specifically regarding the role emotion plays in organizational behavior. We conclude that emotional intelligence is attracting deserved continuing research interest as an individual difference variable in organizational behavior related to the way members perceive, understand, and manage their emotions.

The case for the ability-based model of emotional intelligence in organizational behavior

In this second counterpoint article, we refute the claims of Landy, Locke, and Conte, and make the more specific case for our perspective, which is that ability-based models of emotional intelligence have value to add in the domain of organizational psychology. In this article, we address remaining issues, such as general concerns about the tenor and tone of the debates on this topic, a tendency for detractors to collapse across emotional intelligence models when reviewing the evidence and making judgments, and subsequent penchant to thereby discount all models, including the ability-based one, as lacking validity. We specifically refute the following three claims from our critics with the most recent empirically based evidence: (1) emotional intelligence is dominated by opportunistic academics-turned-consultants who have amassed much fame and fortune based on a concept that is shabby science at best; (2) the measurement of emotional intelligence is grounded in unstable, psychometrically flawed instruments, which have not demonstrated appropriate discriminant and predictive validity to warrant/justify their use; and (3) there is weak empirical evidence that emotional intelligence is related to anything of importance in organizations. We thus end with an overview of the empirical evidence supporting the role of emotional intelligence in organizational and social behavior.

Diversity and Emotion: The New Frontiers in Organizational Behavior Research

This article provides a review of recent developments in two topical areas of research in contemporary organizational behavior: diversity and emotions. In the section called “Diversity,”we trace the history of diversity research, explore the definitions and paradigms used in treatments of diversity, and signal new areas of interest. We conclude that organizational behavior in the 21st century is evolving to embrace a more eclectic and holistic view of humans at work. In the section called “Emotions,” we turn our attention to recent developments in the study of emotions in organizations. We identify four major topics: mood theory, emotional labor, affective events theory (AET), and emotional intelligence, and argue that developments in the four domains have significant implications for organizational research, and the progression of the study of organizational behavior. As with the study of diversity, the topic of emotions in the workplace is shaping up as one of the principal areas of development in management thought and practice for the next decade. Finally, we discuss in our conclusion how these two areas are being conceptually integrated, and the implications for management scholarship and research in the contemporary world.