On the relative complexity of labelled modal tableaux

We investigate the relative complexity of two free-variable labelled modal tableaux(KEM and Single Step Tableaux, SST). We discuss the reasons why p-simulation is not a proper measure of the relative complexity of tableaux-like proof systems, and we propose an improved comparison scale (p-search-simulation). Finally we show that KEM p-search-simulates SST while SST cannot p-search-simulate KEM.

Alternating offer games and private rulings of the Australian Tax Office

The concept of submitting oneself to a voluntary negotiation is by no means new to big business. Formal bargaining has been quite successful over the years in providing the venue for agents to explore a more logical and mathematical approach to bargaining. However in more recent times external influences have been applied to agents who provide better deals for favored executives. This external influence has displayed itself in taxtion negotiations to the extent that tax office agents have been dismissed for irresponsible conduct. We explore this specific type of negotiation using an alternating offer bargaining game to model the particular influences, which create unfair rulings in negotiations. By the constraints of this systematic mathematical approach to negotiation, we will explore the advantages of a more formal game theoretic approach. In this presentation we will also elaborate on finding Nash Equilibrium in alternating offer games.