Primary personality trait correlates of religious practice and orientation

The aim of the study was to examine the relationships between Eysenck's primary personality factors and various aspects of religious orientation and practice. Some 400 UK undergraduates completed questionnaires constructed from the Batson and Schoenrade Religious Life Inventory (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991) and the Eysenck Personality Profiler (Eysenck, Barrett, Wilson, & Jackson, 1992). As is generally found, all the religious variables correlated negatively with the higher order personality factor of psychoticism. In contrast, among the primary factors, those associated with neuroticism appeared to be the strongest indicators of religiosity. In particular, all the primary traits classically linked to neuroticism correlate positively with the quest orientation. However, fewer primary traits predict religious behaviour in regression and of these, a sense of guilt is the greatest and a common predictor of extrinsic, intrinsic and quest religiosities. Upon factor analysis of the significant personality predictors together with the three religious orientations, the orientations formed a single discrete factor, which implies that extrinsic, intrinsic and quest religiosities have more in common with one another than with any of the personality traits included in the study. This suggests that religious awareness may itself be an important individual difference that is distinct from those generally associated with models of personality. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Conflicting obligations: Pufendorf, Leibniz and Barbeyrac on civil authority

Barbeyrac's republication of and commentary on Leibniz' attack on Pufendorf's natural-law doctrine is often seen as symptomatic of the failure of all three early moderns to solve a particular moral-philosophical problem: that of the relationship between civil authority and morality. Making use of the first English translation of Barbeyrac's work, this article departs from the usual view by arguing that here we are confronted by three conflicting constructions of civil obligation, arising not from the common intellectual terrain of moral philosophy, but from divergent religious and political cultures. If this approach makes the three constructions less susceptible to theoretical reconciliation, then it opens them to a more revealing historical investigation, in terms of the particular religious and political circumstances in which they arose, and which they were designed to address. The result is that these early modern struggles over the nature of civil obligation confront us again as unfinished historical business.

The Constitutional (In)Validity of Religious Vilification Laws: Implications for Their Interpretation

A study is conducted to determine whether religious vilification laws are contrary to the implied freedom of political communication affirmed in the High Court's decision in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation. He feels that to the extent that religious vilification laws are interpreted with principles, they are likely to leave sufficient place for freedom of religious discussion that happens to be relevantly political, at the same time the implied freedom of political means that the prohibitions imposed by religious vilification laws need to be interpreted narrowly and the exceptions construed widely, in order to leave room for political communication.