Multiscale histograms: Summarizing topological relations in large spatial datasets

Summarizing topological relations is fundamental to many spatial applications including spatial query optimization. In this paper, we present several novel techniques to eectively construct cell density based spatial histograms for range (window) summarizations restricted to the four most important topological relations: contains, contained, overlap, and disjoint. We rst present a novel framework to construct a multiscale histogram composed of multiple Euler histograms with the guarantee of the exact summarization results for aligned windows in constant time. Then we present an approximate algorithm, with the approximate ratio 19/12, to minimize the storage spaces of such multiscale Euler histograms, although the problem is generally NP-hard. To conform to a limited storage space where only k Euler histograms are allowed, an effective algorithm is presented to construct multiscale histograms to achieve high accuracy. Finally, we present a new approximate algorithm to query an Euler histogram that cannot guarantee the exact answers; it runs in constant time. Our extensive experiments against both synthetic and real world datasets demonstrated that the approximate mul- tiscale histogram techniques may improve the accuracy of the existing techniques by several orders of magnitude while retaining the cost effciency, and the exact multiscale histogram technique requires only a storage space linearly proportional to the number of cells for the real datasets.

Alternating offer games and private rulings of the Australian Tax Office

The concept of submitting oneself to a voluntary negotiation is by no means new to big business. Formal bargaining has been quite successful over the years in providing the venue for agents to explore a more logical and mathematical approach to bargaining. However in more recent times external influences have been applied to agents who provide better deals for favored executives. This external influence has displayed itself in taxtion negotiations to the extent that tax office agents have been dismissed for irresponsible conduct. We explore this specific type of negotiation using an alternating offer bargaining game to model the particular influences, which create unfair rulings in negotiations. By the constraints of this systematic mathematical approach to negotiation, we will explore the advantages of a more formal game theoretic approach. In this presentation we will also elaborate on finding Nash Equilibrium in alternating offer games.