Promoting an agenda for nuclear weapons elimination: The Canberra Commission and dilemmas of disarmament

This paper examines the role of the Canberra Commission in terms of consolidating and influencing the agenda on international negotiations towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Commission's Report is significant for two main reasons. First, it represents a unique form of disarmament diplomacy by the Australian Government which combined the post-Cold War international climate of security cooperation with the foreign policy aspirations of an activist middle power. Second, the Report refutes the strategic, technological and political arguments against nuclear elimination in a comprehensive and convincing manner, arguing that without elimination, the world faces increased threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This paper thus concludes that the Canberra Commission has been instrumental in strengthening the taboo against the possession, testing or use of nuclear weapons.

Australia's relationship with the United States: The case for greater independence

A number of recent events-especially attempts to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement and Australia's participation in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq(1)-have thrown Australia's relationship with the United States into sharp relief. While this relationship has historically enjoyed strong bilateral endorsement, such uncritical support is beginning to unravel. At the very least, the relationship is being subjected to a renewed, more critical scrutiny. This paper argues that a dispassionate analysis of the relationship is appropriate and overdue. Not only are the benefits that accrue to 'Australia' from the relationship debateable, even when judged within the limited calculus of the 'national interest', but Australia's uncritical support for US foreign policy is also helping to entrench potentially damaging aspects of American foreign policy and somewhat ironically-undermining the legitimacy of its pre-eminent 'hegemonic' position.

Drawing a line in the Taiwan Strait: 'strategic ambiguity' and its discontents

The Bush administration's continuing emphasis on US military deterrence of the PRC on behalf of Taiwan threatens to undermine the posture of 'strategic ambiguity' that the United States has proclaimed since 1979. This article argues for the retention of 'strategic ambiguity' and traces the origins of revisionist sentiment towards this effective conflict avoidance mechanism to reactions within the US foreign policy community to the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Case studies of this crisis and its predecessors in 1954-55 and 1958 demonstrate that US military deterrence was not a decisive factor in their resolution. US and PRC initiatives and responses in the 1950s crises introduced the essential elements of 'strategic ambiguity' into the triangular relationship between themselves and Taiwan. In particular, they established a precedent for the United States and the PRC in circumscribing the issue of Taiwan so as to achieve a political accommodation.

Australia's Security and the threat of Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia

Australian foreign and security policy confronts a series of difficult challenges in coping with the emergence of an Islamic extremist threat in Southeast Asia. Australian policy makers are being drawn into unfamiliar linkages with moderate Islam, and into closer cooperation with Indonesia, the most populous Islamic nation in the world, in an attempt to offset Islamic extremists. Further, they must achieve those objectives at a time when important interests are at stake beyond Southeast Asia, when bipartisan agreement about the direction of foreign policy is waning, and when divisions over the appropriate trajectory of Australian security policy are intense. A delicacy almost unprecedented in Australian foreign policy will be required.

Die Grünen and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

This paper discusses the German Greens' recent policy on Israel and Palestine, from the beginning of the first red-green federal government to the present. It looks at Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's diplomatic role in the Middle East, and the Greens' current very mild policy with regards to Israel, especially when compared to earlier Green attitudes to the region. This is explained with reference to both the continuing relevance of German history to German foreign policy, and the constraints that participation in the federal coalition - and supplying Germany's Foreign Minister - place on the Greens. The influence of history and power on the German Greens is further illustrated by a comparison of German Green attitudes to Israel with the US Greens' much more critical position.

US hegemony and Southeast Asia - The impact of, and limits to, US power and influence

The United States has exerted a major influence on Southeast Asia, especially since World War II. As both a promoter of neoliberal reform and as the key strategic actor in the wider East Asian region, the impact of U.S. power has been immense. But both the Asian economic crisis and its aftermath, and the more recent war on terror, have highlighted the contradictory impact of evolving U.S. foreign policy and intervention in the region. At both an elite and a mass level there is evidence of resentment about, and hostility toward, U.S. policy and its perceived negative effects. This article outlines how U.S. foreign policy has impacted the region in the economic, political, and security spheres, and argues that not only has it frequently not achieved its goals, but it may in fact be undermining both America's long-term hegemonic position in the region and any prospects for political liberalization.

Identity, difference, and the dilemmas of inter-Korean relations: Insights from northern defectors and the German precedent

Questions of identity have become increasingly central to the study of foreign policy and security, particularly in constructivist debates. But very few of the resulting insights have been applied to the Korean situation, where discussions about security and inter-Korean relations remain dominated by strategic and geopolitical issues. The main task of this article is to address this shortcoming by examining the experience of North Korean defectors in South Korea and the precedent of German unification. Both of these domains of inquiry reveal that identity differences between North and South persist far beyond the ideological and political structures that created them in the first place. Born out of death, fear, and longing for revenge, these identity patterns lie at the heart of Korea's security dilemmas. Unless taken seriously by scholars and decision makers, the respective tensions between identity and difference will continue to cause major political problems. (Key words: Inter-Korean relations, North Korean defectors, German unification)