A complex systems approach to the value of ecological resources

A theory of value sits at the core of every school of economic thought and directs the allocation of resources to competing uses. Ecological resources complicate the modem neoclassical approach to determining value due to their complex nature, considerable non-market values and the difficulty in assigning property rights. Application of the market model through economic valuation only provides analytical solutions based on virtual markets, and neither the demand nor supply-side techniques of valuation can adequately consider the complex set of biophysical and ecological relations that lead to the provision of ecosystem goods and services. This paper sets out a conceptual framework for a complex systems approach to the value of ecological resources. This approach is based on there being both an intrinsic quality of ecological resources and a subjective evaluation by the consumer. Both elements are necessary for economic value. This conceptual framework points the way towards a theory of value that incorporates both elements, so has implications for principles by which ecological resources can be allocated. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Why is economics not a complex systems science?

The article argues that economics will have to become a complex systems science before economists can comfortably incorporate institutionalist and evolutionary economics into mainstream theory. The article compares the complex adaptive system of John Foster with that of standard economic theory and illustrates the difference through an examination of familiar production function. The place of neoclassical, Keynesian economics in complex systems is considered. The article concludes that convincing, multiple models have been made possible by the increase in widely available computing power available.

Teaching economic philosophy: Economics, ethics and the search for the right maximand

Economic philosophy is not often taught, and is not necessarily easily taught. It involves enquiry into implicit assumptions within orthodox economics and within alternatives to it. It seeks to highlight why it is that some critics object that neoclassical economics is too atomistic, hedonistic, and rationalistic, or why others lament that there is much hidden metaphysics in Friedman and his Chicago School colleagues. It addresses the issue of whether - in a reversal of the view that economics is the imperialistic social science - significant philosophical assumptions have been silently but inescapably imported into orthodox economics. This paper seeks to facilitate the presentation of such material with illustrations selected from social economics, development economics, and critiques of utilitarianism.

The Hierarchical Structure of the Firm: A Geometric Perspective

This paper incorporates hierarchical structure into the neoclassical theory of the firm. Firms are hierarchical in two respects: the organization of workers in production and the wage structure. The firm’s hierarchy is represented as the sector of a circle, where the radius represents the hierarchy’s height, the width of the sector represents the breadth of the hierarchy at a given height, and the angle of the sector represents span of control for any given supervisor. A perfectly competitive firm then chooses height and width, as well as capital inputs, in order to maximize profit. We analyze the short run and long run impact of changes in scale economies, input substitutability and input and output prices on the firm’s hierarchical structure. We find that the firm unambiguously becomes more hierarchical as the specialization of its workers increases or as its output price increases relative to input prices. The effect of changes in scale economies is contingent on the output price. The model also brings forth an analysis of wage inequality within the firm, which is found to be independent of technological considerations, and only depends on the firm’s wage schedule.